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This paper examines the complexities of German Nationalism during the Great War by 
employing a micro-level comparative analysis of the intellectual biographies of two superficially 
antithetical writers, Ernst Jünger and Hermann Hesse. It begins with a methodological overview, 
followed by a general sketch of the historical context, before examining and defining each man’s 
ideas about Nationalism in isolation, concluding with a direct comparative analysis. This study 
demonstrates that Jünger and Hesse’s ideas, far from being antithetical, actually ran parallel to 
each other. It illustrates that both men viewed Nationalism as the driving force for individual 
internal transformations, which, in aggregate, were a vehicle for external societal transformation. 
The evolution of this common definition of Nationalism and its societal role mirrored the over-
arching emotional dynamics of World War I, particularly the profound need to find catharsis and 
meaning in the years immediately after the armistice.   
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
In May 2012 I was in Berlin for three weeks doing research for this project, when a friend of 
mine who was studying abroad in Freiburg for the semester came to visit me for a weekend with 
two of his friends from Ireland. On the first night of his visit, the four of us found ourselves at a 
table in a small dive bar (beers for one Euro!) at three o’clock in the morning, conversing tiredly 
in English. In the midst of this conversation, a heavily intoxicated, middle-aged Bavarian man 
staggered over to us and promptly sat himself down at our table. It turns out that his mother was 
an English teacher, and he relished the opportunity to converse in it with some native speakers. 
While we were all going around the table with similar short introductions, one of the Irishmen 
spoke for a bit of his love for his country and concluded with a brief apology, remarking “I’m 
sorry; I’m a bit of a patriot.” Upon hearing this, the Bavarian immediately shook his head and 
said to us “we don’t have that here.” 
 I have thought of this anecdote many times in the course of writing this thesis because it 
seemed to embody so many of the central themes of the project, both implicit and explicit: the 
immense shifts in German national identity conception over the course of the twentieth century, 
with the broader implication of Nationalism’s near-infinite pliability; the lack of popular 
understanding of this pliability; the continuing legacy of the World Wars; the centrality of 
communal identities to personal identity—the list goes on. But above all, it confirmed for me in a 
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first-hand, experiential way, the continuing importance of Nationalism, and how imperative a 
broader historical understanding of this phenomenon remains to this day—reaffirming the core 
motivation for this study.    
 On that note, I now turn to those who made this study possible in the first place. I must 
state emphatically that—as anyone who has ever worked on a scholarly work of any length 
knows—I could not have completed this project alone, and I’d like to offer my humble thanks to 
all of those who made the completion of this thesis possible.  
First, I must begin by thanking all of those on my committee, both official and 
‘unofficial’ members. I could not have asked for a more knowledgeable, insightful, and 
altogether better thesis advisor than Dr. Gregor Thum. Dr. Thum took over as advisor for this 
project after it was already a year in the making and was instrumental in helping me focus my 
research and my arguments, as well as honing my writing ability. As he remarked in one of our 
meetings, “you know me, I always have something to say”, and for that I could not be more 
grateful; without his consistent, honest—but always constructive—criticisms I could not have 
completed this project. I had the pleasure of taking four classes with Dr. Leslie Hammond over 
the course of my undergraduate career, and through it all she has had to endure hearing almost 
my total excess of thoughts on Nationalism, Imagined Communities, the importance of the Great 
War, Imperial Germany, and a host of other topics. Without her seminars and numerous insights, 
this project would have mired in a host of methodological and conceptual problems, my writing 
ability would likely have stagnated, and I would have been deprived of the opportunity to 
participate in some of the most interesting and illuminating discussions of my undergraduate 
studies. I cannot thank her enough. If I were to try to thank Dr. Tony Novosel for everything he 
has done for me, this preface would likely run longer than my actual analysis. I hope it will 
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suffice to say that the opportunity to be the UTA for his class on World War I was one of the 
highlights of my undergraduate academic experience, and that as an academic advisor and 
mentor there are no words to describe Tony other than as a brilliant saint. I must of course also 
extend my deepest thanks to Dr. Donna Harsch of Carnegie Mellon University for volunteering 
her time to be the outside faculty member of my committee. Finally, I must thank Dr. Arpad von 
Klimo, who served as my ‘unofficial’ thesis advisor for the first year of this project. It was for 
Dr. Klimo’s classes on Modern Germany and Nationalism that I first composed the paper that 
served as the basis for this thesis, and it was his classes which first introduced me to 
Nationalism’s complexity in earnest. Further, his recommendation and communications on my 
behalf enabled me to make my research trip to Berlin, and it was the independent study I did 
with Dr. Klimo that introduced me to much of the literature that was essential for the completion 
of this thesis. I extend to him my absolute deepest thanks; this project would not have happened 
without him.  
I must also thank the History department generally—both fellow students and faculty—
for the many hours of insightful conversations on such a wide variety of topics garnered both 
inside and outside of classes. More specifically, I want to thank all of those involved in the AJ 
Schneider Study Abroad Scholarship, which funded my research trip to Berlin.  
I would be seriously remiss if I did not thank the University Honors College which, in 
addition to providing the opportunity for the BPhil in the first place, awarded me three 
Brackenridge Research Fellowships, providing funding for my research and enabling me to 
spend the entirety of the summer of 2012 working on this project. Furthermore, the Brackenridge 
community was a repository of fellow intellectually-minded undergraduates whose depth and 
breadth of knowledge was both astounding and served to widen and deepen my own knowledge, 
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not just those pertaining to my own research interests but myriad other topics as well. Their 
pointed questions and criticisms have proved invaluable.  
There are a few other individuals who deserve mention. I extend my gratitude to Ms. 
Laura Caton in the German Department for proof-reading my translations, as well as her 
continued interest in the project itself. In addition to her practical help, she offered an empathetic 
ear many a time over the past year. Deep thanks go to Dr. Jörg Echternkamp of the 
Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt, Potsdam, for taking the time to meet with me during my 
trip to Germany. His insights were crucial to the conceptual aspects of this study. I would also 
like to thank my roommates—Brandon Baun, Pat Bewick, Ron Gathagan, and Ian McGlory—for 
the many moments of welcome distraction, invaluable for keeping my sanity throughout this 
whole project, but also for their friendship. Many thanks are extended to Zach Zafris; he has not 
only become an invaluable friend over the past year, but was also the one who first introduced 
and encouraged me to pursue taking over for him as a UTA, the experience of which not only 
expanded my knowledge, but introduced me to the essential aspect of scholarship outside of 
research. 
Finally, I extend my sincerest and most heartfelt thanks to my parents, Todd and Ann 
Marie Hershey, for their continuous love and support not just over the past four years, but 
throughout my entire life. Without them I would not be here in any sense, and there are no words 
to express how thankful I am to them for everything that they’ve given and done for me. The 
best I can do is to dedicate this thesis to them: I love both of you. 
Of course, as absolutely invaluable as all of those mentioned above have been, I bear 
complete responsibility for any errors and deficiencies which may remain in this study: they are 
mine, and mine alone.  
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I had a professor once, who liked to tell his students that there were only ten plots in all of 
fiction. Well I’m here to tell you he was wrong. There is only one: who am I. 
—Miss Ritter, The Amazing Spider-Man (2012) 
 
 
War is always, in a basic sense, a process of [identity] ‘deconstruction’. 
—Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (2002)  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION—SHADOWS OVER THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The First World War is one of the key breaking points in western history. Eric Hobsbawm, for 
example, postulated that World War I was a dual watershed, both the beginning of the western 
‘descent into barbarism’ and the point of division between the long nineteenth century and the 
short twentieth.1 Nationalism was an inherent aspect of World War I, and the hypothesis that 
nationalist fervor and sentiment came to be one of the primary causes of the war’s outbreak, 
ferocity, and duration is one that enjoys wide support.2  
However, while Nationalism was present in all combatant nations, the relationship 
between the First World War and Nationalism is of even greater (and possibly greatest) 
importance in Germany, due to the conception of that relationship. The notion of a German 
Sonderweg, or ‘Special Path’, “maybe the most prominent variant of secular historical 
narratives,” whereby the Germans somehow deviated from the acceptable ‘norms of 
Westernness’, is strong evidence of a perception that Germany and German Nationalism were 
                                                 
1 Eric Hobsbawm. “Barbarism; A User’s Guide” (Address to Amnesty International, 1994), 4-5; See also Eric 
Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire:1875-1914 (New York: Vintage, 1989),  and Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A 
History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage, 1994.,  
2 There are a vast number of sources dealing with this topic, but  for the primary literature consulted in regard to 
this paper, see Volker R. Berghahn, Europe in the Era of Two World Wars: From Militarism and Genocide to Civil 
Society (New York: Princeton UP, 2006): 15-25, 33-57; Marc Ferro, The Great War: 1914-1918 (New York: 
Routledge, 1973): 10-20; Hobsbawm, The Age Of Empire, 302-327; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 
14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000): 113-158; Samuel R. Williamson Jr, “The 
Origins of the War”, in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, ed. Hew Strachan (New York: Oxford 
UP, 1998): 13.  
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intrinsically jingoistic, expansionist, and aggressive.3 Gary Sheffield, for example, has the 
audacity to go so far as to postulate that Germany and German Nationalism represented a 
complete antithesis of the Western democratic ideals of the Entente, rendering the First World 
War an ideological struggle between democracy and autocracy.4 And while the Sonderweg thesis 
has largely fallen out of favor, it continues to largely define the debate about German history and 
has left a largely unfilled gulf in the historiography, particularly regarding the continuities of that 
history.5 These historiographical concerns, coupled with the dynamic shifts and variety of 
experiences and perceptions of Nationalism, beg a number of important questions about the 
relationship between the Great War and German Nationalism that warrant new historical 
investigation.  
Fundamentally, this study asks the question “What was German Nationalism during the 
First World War? How was it understood and how was it experienced?” But such a query has a 
number of ontological, definitional, and methodological implications, whose elucidation is an 
essential pre-requisite for this analysis. Nationalism is notoriously difficult to define,6 with some 
going so far as to try and avoid a phenomenological definition altogether. Ernest Gellner 
contended in Nations and Nationalism, for example, that “[i]t is probably best to approach this 
                                                 
3 Ulrich Herbert, “Europe in High Modernity”, Journal of Modern European History 5:1 (2007): 6-7. 
4 See Gary Sheffield, “The Origins of World War One.” BBC History. Last updated March 8, 2011.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml; Gary Sheffield, “This War Was No Accident” 
The Guardian, November 7, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/08/first-world-war-causes-
deliberate-accident . There is not sufficient space here to go into the mass of problems with Sheffield’s thesis in 
adequate detail. Briefly, it should be noted that Russia, the most autocratic state in Europe at the time, was a 
member of the ‘Democratic’ Entente. Furthermore, it should also be noted that these ‘western ideals’ 1) were not 
adhered in practice as strongly as they were in theory and 2) that these were very loosely defined, but can be 
assumed to encompass mostly nineteenth-century liberal Enlightenment values such as democratic government, 
natural rights, etc.    
5 Helmut Walser Smith, “When the Sonderweg Debate Left Us”, in Imperial Germany Revisited: Continuing Debates 
and New Perspectives (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011): 21-36.  
6 The literature on this topic is a vast one, but for a very concise overview of this literature see “What is 
Nationalism?” First accessed January 12, 2011, http://www.nationalismproject.org/what.htm 
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problem [of definitional difficultly] by using [nationalism and nation] without attempting too 
much in the way of formal definition, and looking at what culture does.”7 This is valid in terms 
of prioritization (so one avoids becoming permanently bogged down in the theoretical at the 
expense of the concrete), but is also supremely problematic in that it leaves definition of these 
terms at the mercy of the reader. The key issue with this is that there are strong (often negative) 
connotations attached to the term Nationalism which can lead to misunderstanding and 
misperception;8 there are in fact two definitional layers—one colloquial, one academic9—which 
need to be separated in order to gain true clarity of analysis.  
When Nationalism and its related terms are discussed in the colloquial vernacular, a 
fundamental distinction between Nationalism and Patriotism is posited which is one of the 
primary sources of Nationalism’s negative connotations. Nationalism is often seen as a form of 
bastardized Patriotism—Patriotism taken ‘too far’, or the result of an added hateful or jingoistic 
element to an otherwise loving, natural and positive impulse. Looked at from the opposite angle, 
Patriotism can be viewed as ‘accepted Nationalism’; Nationalism stripped to its most broadly 
admissible and tolerable core. 
                                                 
7 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1983): 6-7.  
8 Benedict Anderson, for example, writes in his introduction to Imagined Communities that “[m]y point of 
departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word’s multiple significations, nation-
ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind.” Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2nd Ed., 2006): 4, emphasis added. Pieter 
Judson provides a more specific example in his ‘Note on Language Use’ which precedes his analysis of nationalist 
activists on the language frontiers of Imperial Austria: “Writing about multilingual regions in a way that does not 
privilege a nationalist frame of reference requires considerable agility on the part of the historian…. I refer to place 
names in the two (and occasionally three) languages spoken by their inhabitants. Although this practice may seem 
cumbersome to some readers, it helps challenge normative assumptions that presume that places and people have 
authentic national identities.” Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers in 
Imperial Austria (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006): xiii; emphasis added.  
9 On this point, I am indebted to the advice and insight of Dr. Jörg Echternkamp of the Militärgeschichtliche 
Forschungsamt, Potsdam, who first articulated this distinction to me during a discussion in May 2012.  The 
following analysis of this colloquial/academic distinction follows from that discussion.  
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However, both colloquially defined Nationalism and Patriotism are housed within the 
academic definition of Nationalism. The definition of Nationalism itself, however, first requires 
a definition of the root term: nation. Benedict Anderson  provides one of the best and most 
broadly applicable answers in his seminal study on Nationalism, Imagined Communities—on 
which the definitional and ontological foundation of this study is built—defining the nation as 
“an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”10 
This definition implies, fundamentally, that Nationalism is an extremely modular phenomenon,11 
and this malleability sits at the root of this study’s guiding question. 
All communities are intrinsically made up of individuals, all of whom have some form of 
relationship with, and understanding of, that community, national or otherwise. However, there 
is a paradox in the sense that the community, an aggregation of unique individuals (in this case 
the nation) who all experience and understand that community subjectively and individually, is 
conceived of as an object. This objectification does not just apply to adherents of a ‘nationalist 
mental framework’12—assuming the existence of the nation as an entity with a distinct will, 
purpose and/or tradition—but also to historians. Nationalism is treated as a distinct historical 
phenomenon, analogous to ‘imperialism’, ‘capitalism’, ‘war’, ‘agriculture’, or ‘exploration’.13  
                                                 
10 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. Anderson goes on to clarify and define each element of his definition: the 
nation is imagined because no one member will ever know even half of the nation’s other members personally; 
limited, as no nationalist conceives of all of humanity as belonging to his nation; sovereign, due to the idea’s root 
in the Enlightenment ideal of the sovereign state; and lastly as a community because the nation is conceived as a 
broad horizontal fraternity.  
11 Ibid., 4-5.  
12 For a concise explanation/examination of Nationalism as an interpretive schema, see Judson, Guardians of the 
Nation, 256-257.  
13 The important shared characteristic amongst these phenomena is that all can be studied across both time and 
space; one can study the history and rise of capitalism or the emergence of agriculture in the same way that one 
can study the history of Nationalism. One can compare English capitalism to American capitalism to Japanese 
capitalism, or compare agriculture in the fifth century to agriculture in the sixteenth in the same way on can 
compare German vs. Vietnamese Nationalism, or Nationalism in the nineteenth vs. the twenty-first century.  
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What emerges from this paradox is a subject/object dichotomy which sits at the heart of 
the definition of Nationalism: the nation is the object, while the citizens of the nation are the 
subjects perceiving that object. This gives rise to a dual definition of Nationalism following 
along this partition—one macro and one micro. The macro denotation refers to Nationalism as a 
historical phenomenon, capital-N Nationalism, analogous to all of the other historical 
phenomena listed above. The micro denotation of nationalism—notice here that the use of a 
lower-case-n versus a capital-N is intentional—refers to the subjective perceptions of the 
citizenry of their relationship to the nation. In this sense, there are as many nationalisms as there 
are members of the national imagined community. In essence, little-n nationalism denotes a 
single relationship—or perhaps rather a single perception of the relationship—between subject 
and object, citizen and nation. Capital-N Nationalism, by contrast, can be thought of as the 
aggregation of these individual, subjective relationships; the over-riding trends in the 
nationalisms. Consequently, the term ‘nationalist’ denotes only an individual who perceives his 
relationship with the nation in positive terms; a person for whom the citizen-nation relationship 
has a positive connotation.  
These definitions, however, raise a serious methodological concern, as it is impossible 
(not to mention impractical, if the possibility existed) to analyze each member of a given nation’s 
subjective perception of his nation and his unique experience with Nationalism. This issue can be 
resolved, however, through the use of intellectual field theory. Historian Fritz Ringer, building 
on the foundation of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, defines an intellectual field in the following 
way: 
An intellectual field at a given time and a place is made up of agents taking up various 
intellectual positions. Yet the field is not an aggregate of isolated elements; it is a 
configuration or a network of relationships. The elements in the field are not only related 
to each other in determinate ways; each also has a specific ‘weight’ or authority, so that 
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the field is a distribution of power as well. The field’s constituents may be individuals; or 
they may be small groups, ‘schools’ or even academic disciplines…. [O]ne can imagine 
field-like relationships within subfields that in turn occupy particular regions within the 
broader intellectual field.14 
 
Starting with this organizational frame, one identifies the major regions of the field, the actors 
that make it up, and their weights, and then, by analyzing each actor and group in comparison to 
the others, illustrates the cleavages and continuities within the field. In addition, the intellectual 
field methodology also addresses, and largely solves, another major methodological issue 
stemming from the division between the social and cultural history of World War I by tacitly 
acknowledging that “[t]hose who lived through the war did not experience it as an amorphous 
collection of individuals, independent of political institutions or social affiliations”,15 but as 
members of social, political, cultural, religious, gender, and generational groups, whilst still 
retaining the focus on the individual’s subjective experience and understanding. 
 Starting with this definitional and methodological base, it becomes clear that Great War 
German Nationalism can be best understood as an intellectual field: a distribution of the 
conceptions and definitions of the nation, of various weights. This then prompts the question as 
to its regions/subfields. The French historians Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker 
provide an insightful, if somewhat problematic, starting point, breaking German Nationalism 
down into three overarching categories: “the militants of the Pan-German League…the German 
People as a whole, and Germany’s intellectual, political and military elites.”16 However, to try 
                                                 
14 Fritz Ringer, Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890-1920 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992): 4-5.  
15 Roger Chickering, “The Enduring Charm of the Great War: Some Reflections on Methodological Issues”, in 
Imperial Germany Revisited: Continuing Debates and New Perspectives (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011): 209. 
16 Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, 148. The problem with this trichotomy is that these groups cannot necessarily be as 
cleanly separated as Rouzeau and Becker seem to imply. While a clear division can be, and is, drawn between 
socio-political, intellectual and military elites and non-elite Germans, ‘the German people as a whole’ is too broad 
a category to have any type of analytic value unless it is further broken down, whether geographically, 
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and construct a full intellectual field for even one of these three sub-categories is still far too 
broad; this is a study of intentionally limited scope seeking to examine Nationalism (or perhaps 
rather nationalism) on the micro, individual level. Thus, this study focuses only on the 
intellectual—specifically literary—elites for two reasons. The first is practical: one can only 
examine the nationalism of those who wrote about and discussed it, hence authors are ideal. The 
second and even more important reason, however, is that Nationalism is not an inherently logical 
phenomenon.  
As Anderson states in his introduction to Imagined Communities, “one tends 
unconsciously to hypostasize the existence of Nationalism-with-a-big-N (rather as one might 
Age-with-a-capital-A) and then classify ‘it’ as an ideology.”17 He goes on to rightly point out 
that “it would…make things easier if one treated [Nationalism] as if it belonged with ‘kinship’ 
and ‘religion’, rather than with ‘liberalism’ or fascism’”; to, in effect, remove the intellectual 
connotations—as well as the assumption of a logical consistency—from the term.18 What he 
subtly points to with this statement is something more explicitly stated on the preceding page: 
“[t]o understand [Nationalism and nation-ness] properly we need to consider carefully how they 
have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, 
today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.”19 Nationalism’s emotionality has the 
important implication that it is not intrinsically understood in articulate, concrete terms. In 
Europe at least, it was the intellectual elites that were most central in the concrete shaping of 
                                                                                                                                                             
generationally, economically, etc. Furthermore, ‘Pan-German militants’ contain members from both the elite and 
non-elite groups, which make it a somewhat suspect category as part of Rouzeau and Becker’s triumvirate.   
17 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5. Emphasis original. One will note that Anderson, despite disparaging such a 
notion, actually makes the same identification of Nationalism’s macro denotation as a historical phenomenon, 
which served as the basis for the use of capital versus lower-case N Nationalism in this study.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 4. Emphasis added.  
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Nationalism in the nineteenth century20—who gave specific, readily comprehensible meaning(s) 
to this emotional phenomenon—and thus their nationalisms are immanently imbued with a much 
greater weight vis-à-vis the rest of the field.  
Looking within this subfield of intellectuals’ nationalisms, the subdivisions are those of 
what Roger Chickering terms “communities of experience”—collectives which structured the 
way the war was perceived, experienced, and interpreted.21 In fact, the largest of these was 
actually the nation itself, which united “Germans as Germans” (a clear parallel of Rouzeau and 
Becker’s category of ‘the German People as a whole’), and Nationalism—in a continuation of 
the trend from the previous half-century or so22—that provided the “official” interpretation of the 
war. Finally, within this broader experiential community, the most basic division was that 
between frontline and home front, although there were further divisions along class, generation, 
religion, and gender lines.23    
Given these myriad concerns, how then to proceed in answering the questions put forth at 
the beginning of this study? In seeking to gain some more capacious insights into German 
Nationalism, it is clear that within the region of literary elites, it is vital to cover both front and 
home front in a way that captures both the uniqueness of the individuals’ conceptions while also 
knowing those understandings were accepted in a broader way, i.e. ‘weighed heavily’ within the 
region. Subsequently, this study’s scope has been intentionally limited to a detailed, micro-level 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 71. 
21 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge UP, 2004): 
130. He states that “Class, gender, generation, and confession all combined to structure basic communities of 
experience in wartime Germany. These communities provided the frames of collective identity, as well as several 
different cultural vocabularies for making sense of the war. The common experience of combat defined one such 
community at the front, while the homefront played host to several others. These were nurtured in routine 
encounters among people who faced common problems, shared common lifestyles, lived in the same 
neighborhoods, and knew one another personally.” 
22 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 83-111. 
23 Chickering, Imperial Germany, 130-131. 
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comparative analysis of two of Germany’s leading twentieth century authors—Ernst Jünger and 
Hermann Hesse—between 1914 and 1924, and traces the evolution of their conceptions of 
nationalism—their intellectual biographies—alongside their more traditional, experiential 
biographies. 
No two writers appear more antithetical. Jünger was a young, nationalistic, frontline 
soldier who returned from the war claiming an even greater faith in the nation and nationalism in 
1924 than in 1914. He enjoyed considerable success in Germany almost from the moment his 
first printed work appeared in 1920,24 and his ideas resonated strongly with his community of 
experience, which doubled as his intended audience: former Frontsoldaten that had survived the 
trenches of the western front.25 Hesse’s experience was nearly the exact opposite. He was a 
middle-aged established author who spent the duration of the war behind the lines speaking to an 
almost entirely different experiential community—other established authors, professors, artists, 
intellectuals and ‘cultured’ persons—and, as early as September 1914, expressed criticism of the 
Kriegspsychose (‘War Psychosis’) coming from Germany, as well as the rest of western Europe.   
Analysis of the writings, actions, and ideas of Jünger and Hesse illustrates that these two 
men—with superficially contradictory views and occupying entirely separate sub-fields—in 
actuality not only shared a number of important commonalties, but ultimately came to utilize 
Nationalism in the same way. They indicate that German Nationalism during the First World 
War chiefly reflected not political shifts and tensions, but the emotional dynamics of the war, 
principally the near-universal need for catharsis after 1918, which both men embodied in ideas of 
individual and societal transformation. They offer the modern reader an empathetic glimpse from 
                                                 
24 Modris Eksteins, “Memory and the Great War” in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, ed. Hew 
Strachan (New York: Oxford UP, 1998): 310. 
25 Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1979): 60.  
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the micro-level into the long shadows—both the phenomenological and the historical—cast over 
the twentieth century, as two men were forced into a moment of profound external and 
existential crisis and confronted the fundamental question of identity: who am I?    
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2.0  GERMAN NATIONALISM: PERCEPTION AND REALITY, 1914-1923 
It is essential to first situate the intellectual biographies of Jünger and Hesse within the larger 
historical context because, of course, neither man experienced the war and its Nationalism in a 
vacuum. It is therefore necessary to first sketch, broadly, the overarching trends in German 
Nationalism during the war. This is not a singular outline however; it is crucial to discern both 
the subjective perceptions of the historical actors and the objective historical reality if one is to 
gain a holistic understanding.26 Further, this sketch is by no means comprehensive: echoing 
Isabel Hull, “I do not offer (yet another) narrative of the war”27  but instead will focus on the 
Wendepunkte—the ‘points of inflection’—that defined the central dynamics of the Germans’ 
experiences with Nationalism during this period, along with the narratives of those experiences: 
the ‘Sprit of 1914’, the onset of disillusionment, and the creation of the ‘Cult of the Dead’ and 
the Dolchstoss, the ‘stab-in-the-back’.  
  
                                                 
26 This point is articulated concisely by John Horne and Alan Kramer: “How contemporaries understood events 
through collective beliefs and cultural constructions is vital. Yet reconstructing what happened cannot rely solely 
on this. It is also indispensable to establish who did what to whom, and on what scale. The analysis of subjectivity 
is central to historical inquiry, but that does not make historical inquiry a purely subjective affair for the historian.” 
John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale UP, 2001): 4. 
27 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 2005): 197. 
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2.1 SPONTANEOUS MOBILIZATION AND THE ‘SPIRIT OF 1914’, 1914-1915 
 
The July crisis and the outbreak of the war in early August did produce a spread of nationalist 
enthusiasm throughout Europe, which Germany did see its share of.28 As Eric Hobsbawm 
described, “[i]t is quite undeniable that the outbreak of war in 1914 produced genuine, if 
sometimes shortlived, outbursts of mass patriotism in the main belligerent countries.”29 This is 
perhaps best exemplified in the socialist response to the war which produced what Kaiser 
Wilhelm II declared as the Burgfrieden, or ‘Fortress Peace’ (more literally ‘Party Truce’) in 
Germany, when the Social Democratic Party (SPD) unexpectedly voted in favor of war bonds in 
the Reichstag.30 This was a manifestation of the larger trend that Barbara Tuchman, in her 
Pulitzer Prize winning analysis of the July Crisis, noted, wherein “Nationhood” swept aside the 
deterrents which were thought to make war an impossibility.31 The Second Socialist 
International for example, which was supposed to unite Europe’s workers across national lines, 
dissolved into its national components as each nation readied for war:32 “[n]ational defense 
transcended any feeling of solidarity across borders.”33 
But it is important to note that these outbursts had deep roots. First, education prior to the 
war, along with the re-emergent interest in sports and the domination of the press, was geared 
                                                 
28 See Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2000). 
29 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (New York: Vintage, 1987): 161.  
30 For a concise description, see Andrew Donson, Youth in the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and 
Authority in Germany, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2010): 6. 
31 Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962): 310-311. 
32 For a concise summary of the Second International’s actions and response to the July Crisis, see Marc Ferro, The 
Great War: 1914-1918 (New York: Routledge, 1973): 38-43; For an excellent history of the Second International, 
see James Joll, The Second International, 1889-1914 (New York: Praeger, 1956).  
33 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2000): 96. 
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towards producing strong feelings of “national faith”.34 And Germany was unique in that the 
army (another socializing institution) “was both the instrument of reactionary repression and the 
quintessence of national integration, [which] helped produce the Kaiserreich’s characteristic 
political culture, in which the military as a symbol and real institution played a central role.”35  
Second, the actual manifestations of this initial nationalistic outpouring were similarly embedded 
in norms of the pre-war world. As Jeffrey Verhey describes in his analysis of the ‘Spirit of 
1914’, the crowds expressed their enthusiasm in ways that were deeply pre-conditioned in the 
years prior to 1914 and drew upon a pre-formed “repertoire of collection action”: “[t]he patriotic 
displays of August 1914—the cheering, singing, marching, and speechmaking—drew upon the 
repertoire of conventions associated with patriotic display, with student marching, or with public 
festival.”36  
Additionally, the goal of these rituals was the same as that of military service: “to turn 
peasants and working-class citizens into ‘Germans’”.37 Nevertheless, these practices should not 
be seen as manifestations of the national political culture: smaller subgroups within Germany 
had their own political cultures, complete with their own repertoires of collective action.38 
Moreover, at least among pre-university age youths, widespread exposure to war-exalting, 
expansionist nationalism and militarism came only with the actual outbreak of the war, not with 
pre-war imperialism:39 only then was that enthusiasm concretely defined—or the attempt made, 
at the very least—in jingoistic terms.   
                                                 
34 Ferro, The Great War, 12-17. 
35 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 103. Emphasis original.  
36 Verhey, Spirit of 1914, 24. 
37 Ibid., 25. 
38 Ibid. The example he uses is, once again the socialists, who had their own special rituals and days of 
commemoration, such as May Day.  
39 Donson, Youth in the Fatherless Land, 5.  
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 These insights point to the largest and most important perception/reality distinction: war 
enthusiasm was by no means a universal phenomenon, nor was it experienced in a uniform way. 
There were important divisions along generational, class, and geographic lines: those marching 
and singing in the nationalist parades were not a representation of a cross-section of the German 
populace, but were mostly educated, urban, middle-class youths.40 Fundamentally, the idea of an 
all-embracing war enthusiasm during the so-called ‘August Days’ is a myth,41 built on the 
interpretation of the urban crowds by the conservative press.42 As Benjamin Ziemann describes 
in his study of the war experience in Bavaria, the vast majority of working class Bavarians 
responded with despondency to the outbreak of war, and in rural areas the war was largely 
greeted with a mixture of anxiety, fear and depression.43 This was the result of several factors, 
the most important being the fact that “nationalistic explanations of the war and negative 
conceptions of the ‘enemy’ were thin on the ground in rural areas”:  
There were no indications that such conceptual models prevailed in any rural community 
[in Bavaria] at any point during the July crisis or the outbreak of the war. People lacked 
positive expectations of the nation state that could be related to the war. In rural Bavaria, 
the engineering of the Wilhelmine Imperial cult succeeded in matching the importance of 
regional loyalties and the cult surrounding the Wittelsbachs only in the Rhenish 
Palatinate and in Protestant areas of Franconia.44 
 
  What was unique about the patriotic displays of 1914 was their spontaneity.45 More 
generally, as Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker observe, “the beginning of the war 
was rapid and unexpected, and its speed was a determining factor in the way the groundwork 
                                                 
40 Verhey, Spirit of 1914, 31. 
41 Benjamin Ziemann, War Experiences in Rural Germany, 1914-1923 (New York: Berg, 2007): 17.  
42 Ibid., 24.  
43 Ziemann, War Experiences, 17-19.  
44 Ibid., 19.  
45 Verhey, Spirit of 1914, 31. He states that “[a]lthough the organized patriotic festival was an everyday event, 
spontaneous ovations were quite rare.” 
.  
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was laid for support of war.” They then make the important point that although war enthusiasm 
was weak outside of the major urban centers and likely did not express the majority’s view, those 
crowds “were the advance guard of a widespread popular support for the war based on 
resignation, acceptance, sometimes despondency, and later a growing resolve.”46 This vanguard 
experienced, somewhat prematurely, the same “emotional dynamic”—patriotic displays which 
often came ‘in spite of themselves’ from ‘something’ or ‘somewhere’ within—that gripped 
Europe more broadly: “We can imagine this same emotional dynamic on a larger scale: what 
emerged forcefully, between late July and in early August 1914, in the hearts of millions of 
Europeans, sometimes unconsciously and involuntarily, was national sentiment. Patriotic feeling 
prevailed.”47  
 It is this strong emotional component that comprises the second unique aspect of the war 
enthusiasm of 1914 and answers the central question put forth by Rouzeau and Becker as to how 
this initial investment survived the realization that the war imagined in the decades prior to 1914 
was, in fact, an “imaginary” war.48 And there is strong evidence that it did survive: voluntary 
enlistment, spurred largely by atrocity stories that strengthened the defensive interpretive 
framework, continued even in countries—such as Germany—with universal conscription, and 
even after reports from the front would have disproved the central notions of the ‘imaginary’ 
war, e.g. that the war would be short, fought in the style of the nineteenth century.49 
 On the whole then, what emerges is a qualified war enthusiasm, defined spontaneously in 
an emotional—i.e. a non-rational—way and varying according to region, age, and class. While 
not universal, at the very least there was a modicum of unity on the level of political and 
                                                 
46 Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, 94-95.  
47 Ibid., 96. Emphasis added. 
48 Ibid., 100.  
49 Ibid., 94-104. For a full explication of the idea of ‘imaginary war’, see Ferro, The Great War, 29-37.  
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intellectual elites and certain segments of the broader populace in Germany, but not unity that 
was defined—or even necessarily understood—in a rational way. There was a perception, or 
perhaps rather an emotionally-salient belief, that Germany had been attacked, which created a 
patriotic meaning for the war, as Roger Chickering summarizes: 
Countless documents of the summer of 1914—speeches, newspaper articles, letters, and 
diary entries, as well as photographs—spoke to a spontaneous and overpowering sense of 
national unity, a unanimity of views about the origins and meaning of the conflict that 
was beginning. This consensus was, to be sure, inchoate and vaguely formulated; it 
nonetheless framed the public understanding of the war, and in some circles it proved 
remarkably durable.50 
 
One could almost as easily say that, quite simply, national unity was felt. 
 
2.2 DEFENSIVE PATRIOTISM AND THE ONSET OF DISILLUSIONMENT, 1916-
1917 
 
 The second pivotal moment is a more prolonged one, and represents a profound 
intensification and expansion of the war effort wherein the war ‘grew total’. As Chickering 
describes, “1916 was a pivotal year”: 
The land battles of 1916 were the most monstrous ever fought. New military leaders 
came to power in Germany, and they did aspire to achieve total mobilization of society’s 
resources and energies. The measures that they inaugurated to achieve this end brought 
the brutal reorganization of the economy for the purposes of making war. Then, at the 
close of the year, the German leadership decided upon a course of military action that 
expanded the scope of war to include all of the world’s major powers.51 
                                                 
50 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge UP, 2004): 
14. 
51 Ibid., 65.  
 17 
 
It was above all the ‘great battles’ of 1916 and 1917—Verdun, the Somme, Passchendaele—that 
took the greatest mental toll on the soldiers themselves, and it is during this period that, at least 
in Bavaria, soldier’s letters first began portending that revolution might follow the war.52  
At the same time, according to Chickering, the frontline soldiers’ experiences with 
Materialschlacht linked the vast majority of soldiers, about eighty percent of the 13,123,011 
Germans who served in the army from 1914-1918, in a common experience wherein they 
endured, first-hand, the paralysis imposed by new military technology on mass armies, and thus 
pioneered a new form of material warfare.53 However, once again, such a capacious assessment 
must be qualified. As Ziemann elucidates, many Bavarian soldiers suffered from profound and 
acute homesickness, and, in direct antithesis to Chickering’s generalization, he asserts that, in 
fact, “camaraderie diminished over the course of the war”, at least amongst rural Bavarian 
soldiers. Overall, the combination of these factors undermined the possibility of soldiers holding 
an aggressive nationalistic comprehension of their experiences: “these factors left little room for 
an interpretation of self geared towards the symbols of a militaristic identity, such as 
comradeship, heroism or the cult of the warrior.”54 It is very telling that Feldpostbriefe (‘Front 
Letters’) expounding the nationalistic elation of the war’s early months “did not survive the 
campaigns of 1916, nor did the sentiments that had inspired [them].”55  
Furthermore, the state of the home-front worsened considerably during these middle 
years. First and foremost, as the war continued and casualties mounted, the war ‘came home’ 
physically manifested in the soldiers, particularly wounded ones. These men were perpetual 
                                                 
52 Ziemann, War Experiences, 92.  
53 Chickering, Imperial Germany, 95.  
54 Ziemann, War Experiences, 121.  
55 Chickering, Imperial Germany, 101.  
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reminders of war in distant lands, and contrasted quite starkly when they mixed with the more 
enthusiastic or anxious young men on their way to the front. As Chickering describes with 
almost brutal succinctness, “[t]he war was about dying,” and by this point in the war casualties 
were such that mourning and the extreme emotional trauma that it concretely manifested became 
increasingly widespread. In addition, “[t]he war was also about injury” and these wounded 
soldiers served as perpetual, grim, and above all, visceral reminders of the often harsh reality at 
the front.56 
Moreover, by this time the effects of the British blockade were beginning to be felt in 
earnest, their negative effects compounded by the intensely harsh winter weather, which 
culminated in the so-called ‘Turnip Winter’ of 1916-1917.57 This had the important 
psychological effect of eroding the illusion of unity created in the summer of 1914. In particular, 
intensely antagonistic perceptions between urban and rural Germans began to take root as a 
result of the food shortage. Those living in cities were almost completely dependent on rural 
producers for their food and, as a result of both shortages and inflation, a near universal 
(inaccurate) perception was created that farmers were exploiting the misery in the cities for 
financial gain, while they themselves were eating heartily.58  
Even more corrosive to the patriotic symbolism of 1914 was the fact that food became a 
public concern as a result of the war, since the massive increase in government involvement in 
the economy compounded these problems for both urban and rural dwellers. As Chickering 
describes, these problems of providing German citizens with the basic necessities of life roughly 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 99-100. 
57 For a succinct summary of the Turnip Winter and its effects on the German home front, see Ibid., 138-144.  
58 Ibid., 142.  
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created a new illusion of unity on the home front, but arrayed against the government and its 
intrusive bureaucracy: 
The state was the public arbiter of hunger. It was also the symbol of the problem…. 
Although much of the criticism of public officialdom was unfair, bureaucratic 
imperiousness and incompetence were convenient, omnipresent targets of popular 
frustration and anger. The situation was fraught with tension, for the public 
administration of hunger also forced unhappy people to congregate in circumstances 
calculated to make them more unhappy.59 
 
 Despite all of this, Rouzeau and Becker contend quite adamantly that the idea that 
support for the war in the belligerent states eroded in any meaningful way during 1914-1918 is 
utterly false.60 The intense emotional experience of patriotism at the war’s outset crystallized in 
an interpretive framework that “largely withstood the enormous casualties and the immense 
sacrifices demanded not only of the troops but, increasingly, of the civilian populations.” In 
aggregate, instances of disillusionment “are outweighed by instances of support, and support 
maintained.”61 This is a direct result of the constitution of that interpretive framework: 
Though they never creased to aspire to peace, the majority of the soldiers in all armies, 
like the majority of people on the home fronts, wished first and foremost not to lose the 
war. The two hopes were not contradictory. Defensive patriotism—defense of the soil 
and defense of their loved ones—structured the way they thought about the war right to 
the end. This was true of  German soldiers too, for though they were occupying forces far 
beyond their national borders, they stubbornly insisted on thinking of their trench 
positions, especially in France, in traditional defensive terms as a ‘watch on the Rhine’…. 
In most of the armies (except Russia), the immense suffering the soldiers endured never 
rid them of the view that each of them had a duty.62  
 
Finally, it is important to note that Rouzeau and Becker make no claim that the intensity 
of that emotional investment remained static from beginning to end, nor that it was identical in 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 143-144. 
60 Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, 108. They state that it is “completely erroneous to imagine that the consensus of 
support for the war eroded in any significant way in the belligerent countries during the conflict.” 
61 Ibid., 100. Emphasis original.  
62 Ibid., 107. Emphasis added.  
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all nations and national-subgroups.63 Instead, their analysis, coupled with the observations and 
qualifications above, suggest a muted dynamism in regards to nationalist sentiment by 1917. The 
schemas forged in 1914 remained intact perhaps directly as a result of the fact that they were 
primarily defensive, not aggressive. Nevertheless, that framework was coming under increasing 
strain as the costs—both human and material—of the war continued to mount and realistic 
prospects for a German victory began to fade. 
 
2.3 DEFEAT, THE DOLCHSTOSS AND THE CULT OF THE FALLEN, 1918-1923 
 
 Following Russia’s exit from the war after the Bolshevik Revolution, the German 
Supreme Command attempted one final mass offensive in the spring of 1918 as a last gamble to 
win the war. But, as David Blackbourn summarizes, this followed a similar pattern to Germany’s 
earlier offensives (and novel tactical and operative innovations) but ultimately with more dire 
consequences: 
Like the advance of August-September 1914 and the first months of unrestricted 
submarine warfare in 1917 it was initially successful. But Germany never had the 
numerical superiority it would have needed in the west… [and by] June the offensive 
petered out, in July the Allies counterattacked, and on 8 August they broke through the 
German lines. This last throw of the dice had cost 800,000 German casualties. The 
Supreme Command now recognized that the war was lost, and in a brazen turn-about 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 105. They go on to make an important historiographical point: “[H]istorians have always emphasized the 
discontinuities rather than the continuities, at the risk of making the duration of the conflict and the scale of the 
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insisted that there was no alternative but to appeal for peace on Woodrow Wilson’s 
terms.64 
 
It is at this point, when Germany was finally defeated, that disillusionment set in in earnest. 
These sentiments were concretely incarnated in two primary forms: the Dolchstoss myth—the 
contention brought forth after the war by the Supreme Command that “the German armies had 
not lost the war…[but had] remained in the field, valiant and in good order, until the homefront 
collapsed in the fall of 1918 amid a bitter harvest of subversion and agitation by pacifists, 
socialists, slackers and Jews”;65and the cult of the fallen—the idealization of those killed in the 
war as heroic martyrs to the national cause. Once again however, these sentiments, along with 
both of their primary manifestations, had deep roots.  
 The shallowest of these roots was actually the myth of the ‘Spirit of 1914’ itself. This 
was because the very contents of that myth “framed the war in terms that could only nourish 
disillusionment.” It was founded on the idea of a universal German exertion, which intrinsically 
implied equal sharing of both the war’s hardships and rewards. Consequently, once that spirit 
and that unity were shown to be a ghost—an illusion—it took on “the aura of an elusive fantasy, 
a painful reminder of the idealism that had reigned in the first hour”: “the expectations that it 
raised became the object of growing popular discontent.”66  
This was central, as the themes of the ‘Spirit of 1914’ made up one of the two central 
roots which enabled the Dolchstoss myth to take hold: “The [Dolchstoss] myth also spoke to the 
themes that had informed the ‘spirit of 1914,’ insofar as the collapse of the great community of 
national resolve could be traced now to the machinations of elements who had never really 
                                                 
64 David Blackbourn, History of Germany, 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century 2nd Edition (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003): 369.  
65 Chickering, Imperial Germany, 187. 
66 Ibid., 17.  
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belonged to it.”67 The second root was the antagonisms between the frontline and the home front 
(to the extent they existed68): the inter-theater tensions, the undeniable (and un-denied) 
exhaustion of those at home, and the complex link between the frontline troops’ performance in 
battle and the productivity of the home front.69 As Blackbourn summarizes, “[s]oldiers had long 
muttered about the ‘treason’ of the home front, and the later ‘stab in the back’ legend was well 
established by the summer of 1918.”70 
 However, as Chickering notes, “[t]he reasons for the…vitality of the legend must be 
sought…in the unsettled politics of memory during the Weimar era,”71 the most crucial aspect of 
which being the creation of the myth and perception of the ungrateful home front, which seemed 
to validate the Dolchstoss interpretation. As Richard Bessel describes, there was an element of 
truth to this myth, at least as it applied to officers: “[m]any officers found the defeat and return to 
the Fatherland humiliating and traumatic; officers frequently were subjected to 
indignities…during the weeks which followed the armistice.” But this should not be extrapolated 
to characterize the homecoming experience of the entire German army, at the very least because 
these indignities were often inflicted by the soldiers themselves;72 conflicts within the army 
between the officers and the soldiers were fairly ubiquitous in the Bavarian army for example.73 
Generally speaking, it appears that image of the home front’s unappreciative reception of the 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 187-188.  
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returning soldiers was not only inaccurate, but almost the exact opposite of what actually took 
place.74   
 How, then, did this image come about? The main Weimar roots of the myth are twofold. 
The first pertains directly to the consequences of the German army’s disintegration in 1918. By 
May 1918, only about four million of the roughly seven million men in the German army were 
on the western front, which shrunk to only about two-and-half out of a rough total of six million 
by October. Subsequently, “only a minority of the German veterans of the First World War still 
in uniform in November 1918 experienced the sort of military demobilization which involved 
marching back home from the trenches at the war’s end.”75 This had important consequences for 
the framing of perceptions: 
[I]t was not necessarily the home front which had failed to do its duty to the heroes 
returning from the war; many of the heroes had behaved in ways rather removed from 
conventional ideas of the heroic. People back home, no doubt stirred by a mixture of 
patriotic feeling (which remained for most an acceptable public emotion) and guilt at 
having enjoyed the comparative safety of the Reich while the soldiers were being killed 
in their hundreds of thousands at the front, made the required public displays of gratitude. 
The difficulty lay in the soldiers’ response. That is to say, it is not so much that the 
civilians had failed to give the returning soldiers a heroes’ welcome, but that a large 
proportion of the heroes had failed to show up.76 
 
 It is this combination of guilt and patriotism that points to the second root of the 
Dolchstoss myth’s salience, as well as to the importance of the cult of the dead: the intense 
emotional needs imposed by the war. This emotional cocktail pertained not just to those on the 
homefront, but also to many of the soldiers themselves; the myths of mistreatment and the 
explanation for that mistreatment offered by the Dolchstoss provided an interpretation to frame 
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the memory of the war and its aftermath in such a way that the guilt was at least partially 
alleviated: 
This image [of the mistreated, unemployed veteran]—with its clear outlines of good and 
evil and its idealization of the front soldier—was altogether easier to accept and to 
present in the public/political spheres than an often messy reality would have been. How, 
for example, could a former soldier admit publicly, in, say, 1930 that he really had not 
spent much time at the front, that during the last months before the Armistice he had done 
everything possible to avoid being sent back into combat, that he already was in 
Germany when peace broke out, that he deserted in order to get home as quickly as 
possible, and then had had an easy time finding a job…? The ambivalent nature of 
people’s lives does not provide a very solid base upon which to build a public identity or 
a clear-cut political commitment. Better to accept the myths, rather than ambivalent, 
contradictory and hard-digest reality, which structured popular memory and popular 
politics.77 
 
In this sense, it is clear that the “strength of this political message lay not in that it was based 
upon what people believed so much as in what people, increasingly, wanted to believe.”78 Its 
success derived from the emotional necessities of the Weimar years.  
It is these personal, emotional needs that are in fact the central element of the cult of the 
dead. While it did have a strong political character framed to support a conservative—i.e. 
nationalistic—interpretation of the war, as well as justify and legitimate right-wing policies 
throughout the interwar years,79 it was first and foremost rooted in the intense bereavement of 
the years after the conflict. War memorials for example—produced in great abundance in the 
years following the war80—contained an intense ritual significance as places where people could 
mourn the dead and be seen mourning them, but this has been “obscured by their political 
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symbolism which, now that the moment of mourning has long passed, is all that we can see.”81 
As Jay Winter describes in his seminal work on the construction of memory, it was only after the 
initial moments of bereavement had passed that these monuments—and the larger cult of the 
dead which they represented—took on a principally political character: 
War memorials marked the spot where communities were reunited, where the dead were 
symbolically brought home, and where separations of war, both temporary and eternal, 
were expressed, ritualized, and in time, accepted. 
 That act was located specifically in time and space. Once the moment of initial 
bereavement had passed, once the widows had remarried, once the orphans had grown up 
and moved away, once the mission of veterans to ensure that the scourge of war would 
not return had faded or collapsed, then the meaning of war memorials was bound to 
change. 
 They could have had no fixed meaning, immutable over time. Like many other 
public objects, they manifest what physicists…call a ‘half-life’, a trajectory of 
decomposition, a passage from active to inert. Their initial charge was related to the 
needs of a huge population of bereaved people. Their grief was expressed in many ways, 
but in time, for the majority, the wounds began to close, and life went on. When that 
happened, after years or decades, then the objects invested with meaning related to loss of 
life in wartime become something else. Other meanings derived from other needs or 
events may be attached to them, or no meaning at all.82 
 
It is in fact the external context—most importantly the emotional context—that altered this final 
element of the nationalist dynamic in the period surrounding the war; the political context did not 
assume primacy until the later Weimar years when the initial emotional necessities of mourning 
had faded, transformed, or been co-opted 
.     
On the whole then, the nationalist dynamic during the First World War was a nuanced and 
relatively subdued one prior to the latter half of 1918. The expressions of nationalism, along with 
the actual sentiments themselves, were rooted firmly in the pre-war world, rendering the 
spontaneous mobilization novel not so much for the feelings and ideas it actually expressed so 
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much as for the speed, depth, and manner in which those sentiments penetrated throughout 
Germany, and the rest of Europe. Further, while a sense of disillusionment did begin to set in as 
early as 1915 and was palpable by the end of the Turnip Winter, overall, that emotional 
nationalist framework, molded and solidified in August of 1914, remained largely intact; it was 
not until Germany’s abrupt defeat that those sentiments sank in in earnest. Finally, the 
emergence and success of the Dolchstoss myth and the cult of the dead were rooted in the intense 
emotional needs imposed by Germany’s defeat and immense losses in the war, and reflect 
similarly deep roots. German nationalism—in both its manifestations and sentiments—therefore 
remained roughly static from 1914-1918.   
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3.0  THE CHRONICLER OF DESTRUCTION: ERNST JÜNGER AND INTERNAL 
NATIONALISM 
In his review of Ernst Jünger’s recently-published war diary, Benjamin Ziemann describes 
Jünger as “the most important protagonist of soldier’s nationalism, who emphatically welcomed 
the Materialschlachten of the First World War,” before going on to intimate the essential 
conceptual pre-requisite necessary for understanding Jünger’s nationalism during the war: “[in 
his diary] Jünger reveals himself not as an ideologist, but rather as an extremely precise 
chronicler of destruction.”83 Jünger the political thinker did not emerge until the latter half of the 
1920’s with his contributions to the conservative revolutionary movement:84 his conception of 
nationalism during World War I is temporally separate from—and, more importantly, prior to—
his expounded ideas from the latter Weimar years. Consequently, if one is to gain the insight(s) 
Jünger can offer into the experience, construction, and conception of German Nationalism during 
the Great War, recognizing this distinction is of paramount importance.   
Jünger’s primary work discussing this period—as well as his most famous—is his 
memoir of his experiences at the front, In Stahlgewittern, ‘The Storm of Steel’. First published in 
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 28 
1920, Storm of Steel is considered “a masterly narrative…[of] the soldier’s soldier”, taken almost 
directly from Jünger’s war diaries, and lacking (comparatively) in the philosophical reflections 
of some of his later writings about the war.85  This makes the early editions of Storm of Steel—
published in 8 different versions between 1922 and 195286— the most genuine account of 
Jünger’s emotional appraisal of the war, aside from his actual war diary; evaluation of his 
published writings is exceedingly difficult as a result of his constant revision of his work.87 As 
Thomas Nevin points out in his biography of Jünger, “Jünger’s memory became more vivid by 
the iterations of its exercise in writing.”88  
As a result, this study relies primarily on the first English translation of Storm of Steel, 
taken from the first revision from 1924—simultaneously considered the first truly “literary” 
edition, as well as the most “vigorously, even aggressively, Nationalist version”89—in 
conjunction with Jünger’s newly-available war diary. This is for two reasons, one practical, the 
other methodological. First, Jünger’s Kriegstagebuch was only published in 2010, and a copy 
was unable to be procured until this study was already nearing completion; time constraints did 
not allow for a full analysis of Jünger’s war diary, hence its use chiefly as a supplement. 
Secondly, and more importantly, because Jünger’s diary was only published recently, it had no 
effect on his weight within the intellectual field at any point during his lifetime, certainly not 
during or after the war.90 It was Storm of Steel that brought Jünger to fame and thus acted as a 
public articulator of nationalist ideas, not his Kriegstagebuch. His war diary is innately important 
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insofar as it is a description of and direct reaction to the experience of the war. Storm of Steel, by 
contrast, serves this descriptive function as well—albeit from a less immediate distance and with 
a slight miasma of memory—but has the additional importance of this directly communicative 
aspect.    
Taken together, these sources illustrate that the evolution of Jünger’s nationalism is that 
from a negative to a positive conception—the journey from a ‘chronicler of destruction’, largely 
free from abstract reflections, to a revolutionary conservative political thinker. Fundamentally 
however, this evolution—a transitory period in Jünger’s life—reflects the primacy of practical 
emotional concerns, correlating with the larger, aggregate emotional dynamic of the front 
experience.  
 
3.1 NEGATIVE NATIONALISM: MOBILIZATION, ADVENTURE-SEEKING, AND 
KRIEGSERLEBNIS, 1913-1918 
 
Jünger joined the German Army in the late summer/early fall and was trained in the reserve 
battalion of Hanover’s 73rd Regiment between October and December 1914 before being 
dispatched to France on 27 December,91 months after the initial enthusiasm of the ‘August Days’ 
had waned. He gave little contemporary discussion to his motivations however. The first entry 
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from his published war diary is from 30 December, en route to the front,92 and In Stahlgewittern, 
like his war diary, also begins with his arrival in France. However, from the outset of his memoir 
he attempted to make the depth of his nationalist convictions blatantly and abundantly evident, 
beginning with a description of his experience of the spontaneous mobilization and the ‘Spirit of 
1914’: 
We had left lecture-room, class-room, and bench… [and] had been welded by a few 
weeks’ training into one corporate mass inspired by the enthusiasm of one thought…to 
carry forward the German ideals of ’70. We had grown up in a material age, and in each 
one of us there was the yearning for great experience…. We had set out in a rain of 
flowers to seek the death of heroes. The war was our dream of greatness, power, and 
glory…. There is no lovelier death in the world…anything rather than stay at home, 
anything to make one with the rest.93 
 
 Given Jünger’s middle-class background and the fact that he was not conscripted but was 
a Kriegsfreiwilliger (‘War Volunteer’) this description may well be accurate,94 as was the case 
for many others. Further, it is critical to note the importance of the volunteer/draftee distinction. 
Kriegsfreiwillige had a deep history as nationalist poets and early crafters of the cult of the dead, 
dating back to the eighteenth century,95 and Jünger noted early on in Storm of Steel that “[t]he 
common soldier could not easily swallow the fact that we were volunteers. He took it to be a sort 
of bumptiousness on our part. I often encountered this notion during the war”96—an indirect 
indication of his lack of the concerned, apathetic resolve with which most people greeted the 
declaration of war. Moreover, it is important to note that throughout his entire description of the 
‘Spirit of 1914’, Jünger implies his primary community of experience through his extensive use 
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of ‘we’—young, educated (and therefore presumably middle-class) Frontsoldaten—as well as 
his feeling that he could speak authoritatively on their behalf. At the very least, it is clear that 
Jünger wanted his Kriegserlebnis (‘first-hand, lived war experience’) to be perceived as 
mirroring the common experience with Nationalism as it was remembered in 1924, after both the 
cult of the dead and the myth of the Dolchstoss were already established.  
Contrasting (at least superficially) with his professed nationalistic enthusiasm, however, 
is the fact that Jünger ran away from home and joined the French Foreign Legion the year before 
the war’s outbreak, at the age of 16.97 This was the most prominent example of the 
adventurousness that was a central feature of the young Jünger’s personality throughout his 
adolescence.98 He described this episode and his mindset at that time in his interviews with 
Julien Hervier in 1986: 
Before the outbreak of World War I, I was planning to go to Africa. At that time, I was 
already something of what is known as a non-conformiste. That was why I had gone to 
join the Foreign Legion, but I was not really visualizing a war. Rather, I was thinking 
about adventures in Africa. I had read a lot of travel books about Africa: Stanley, the 
Dark Continent, works of that sort…. But it all turned out very differently.99  
 
Jünger’s experience in the Legion had in fact been the opposite of exciting: Jünger had hoped to 
experience adventures in Africa’s jungles, but instead ended up largely confined within the 
Legion’s quarters in Oran, from which he escaped, was captured and served ten days in jail. His 
release from the Legion was only secured after considerable effort on his behalf by his father.100 
Now the outbreak of war meant that the conflict could substitute for adventures on the Dark 
Continent.  
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While this does not negate or inherently disprove Jünger’s professed patriotic motivations 
for his enlistment, it offers two important qualifications. First, it elucidates that Jünger sought 
adventure for its own sake, as opposed to intrinsically seeking mortem pro patria, as he would 
later imply after the war. Secondly, and even more importantly, it demonstrates a lack of 
jingoism, hatred and aggression in Jünger’s conception of nationalism preceding the outbreak of 
war, implicit in the fact that 1) Jünger had deliberately joined the French armed forces (and thus 
obviously did not see this as at odds with his German identity) and 2) he clearly intimated his 
feeling that the draftees’ perceptions of volunteers’ bellicosity were inaccurate.  
This hostility-dearth continued throughout the duration of the conflict, evidenced early on 
in his descriptions of occupied France. His third diary entry, from New Year’s Day 1915, while 
stating that “[t]he atmosphere was jolly” upon the troops first arrival at the front, expressed no 
joy at the destruction of the town, which is described from a largely detached standpoint as 
consisting of “destroyed houses, blasted bridges” where “[m]any houses stand abandoned with 
open doors and windows” and “everywhere stand rusted reaping machines.”101 These were the 
sights as he arrived at the Bazancourt train station, where “[t]he breath of war passed by us with 
its peculiar horror”;102 subtle indications of the coupling of excitement for the adventure of the 
war experience with the mild-anxiety of the now un-imaginary war and a lack of nationalistic 
animosity.103  
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Moreover, Jünger’s expression of his sympathy for the inhabitants of occupied France, in 
direct contradiction to analysis by some earlier scholars,104 further illustrates his absence of 
malicious nationalism and a largely empathetic mindset. Reflecting on his diary entry from 29 
November 1915, Jünger stated that, 
The inhabitants were under strict discipline. Trespasses and transgressions were speedily 
visited…with fines or imprisonment. Much as I am the disciple of the logical gospel of 
force, I was disgusted by the painful exaggerations of it I witnessed in those days, such as 
the compulsion of all inhabitants, women included, to salute officers. Such regulations 
are pointless, degrading, and injurious. Such was our method, however, all throughout the 
war. Punctilious over trifles, undecided in the face of severest injuries from within.105   
 
While Jünger still adhered, at least intellectually, to the logic of military necessity pervasive 
throughout the Imperial Germany Army and the officer corps in particular106 (notice that 
assumption of ‘severest injuries from within’ implies the existence of a pernicious resistance 
movement, something disproved by modern scholarship107), in practical terms he was empathetic 
to the populace forced to endure the occupation, which largely precluded any feelings of 
nationalistic (as well as militaristic) chauvinism. Moreover, this absence of hostility extended to 
the English as well. Recounting an instance of live-and-let-live from 11 December, 1915 wherein 
Jünger met with an English officer to discuss a sniper’s killing of one of his men,108 he stated 
that “[w]e said a good deal to each other in the course of the interview in a fashion that can only 
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be described as sportsmanlike, and would gladly have made some exchange of presents in 
memory of the occasion.”109  
In fact, perhaps the sole instance in which Jünger appears to tread even somewhat close 
to a bellicose nationalism occurs with an extension of this empathy to his fellow soldiers who felt 
such hatred. When one of his men was shot through the head by the English as he shoveled dirt 
over the top of the trench, Jünger recounted the reaction of his men, and, while clearly 
empathetic, was conspicuously critical of their inability to understand the impersonality of the 
war: “[The dead man’s] comrades lay in wait a long while…to take vengeance. They sobbed 
with rage. It is remarkable how little they grasp the war as an objective thing. They seem to 
regard the Englishmen who fired the fatal shot as a personal enemy. I can understand it.”110 Even 
this modicum of empathy with hateful nationalism may bear a touch of the personal however. In 
his diary, Jünger described the deceased as “a nice man, married and father of four children”,111 
an indication that this empathy may be based more on personal knowledge of the fallen and his 
connection with the other men, as opposed to a more abstract understanding of nationalist 
antipathy.  
Furthermore, Jünger’s Kriegstagebuch demonstrates that this empathy was not a purely 
abstract exercise which occurred only during his post-war reflections, but took on a markedly 
emotional nature during the war.  His diary entry from 1 December 1915—just under one year 
into Jünger’s war experience—expressed sentiments in a similar vein in painfully specific terms. 
It is worth quoting at length:  
One looks out the window and becomes sad when one sees what has become of Northern 
France. How different it was five years ago.  Where does the cozy culture of the 
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enjoyment of life remain...? This red wine and this round, flaked white bread and the 
delicious ragouts of Northern French kitchens, where do they remain? This vespertine 
community of Maries, of priests and other notables? This existence built upon the joyous 
affirmation of life? Gone! Gone!  And possibly never to return. At the front, the villages 
are destroyed, the trees shot down, the wells fallen into disrepair, the fields churned up 
and overgrown. Here in occupied territory, a people have been forced into a way of life 
that they’ve never known…. 
And I won’t be able to make the trip to Paris and Versailles, won’t be able to be 
happy in the land of wine and joy because between me and you stands a wall, flows a 
stream of blood, of blood possibly shed futilely, in order to make millions of mothers 
collapse in grief and misery. 
I’ve been at war a long time, I’ve seen many fall who were worthy of living. What 
should be made of this murdering and murdering again? I fear too much has been 
annihilated and too little remains to rebuild. Before the war I thought like everyone else: 
down, demolish the old buildings, the new one will be better in any case. But now—it 
seems to me—the culture and everything great is slowly being strangled by the war. The 
war has awakened in me the heartfelt-yearning for the blessings of peace.  
But enough of armchair philosophy! In a few days we should receive new rifles, 
which is a telling sign. One day in our new position will be called: alarm! Back into 
battle, it’ll do us good.112 
 
This entry illustrates a number of essential components of Jünger’s Kriegserlebnis as well as 
essential insights for understanding his nationalism during the war.  
In addition to empathy (which appears much closer to a decidedly attached sympathy, 
along with displaying more than a dollop of respect and admiration for the French people and 
their culture), three additional elements stand out. First, Jünger displays an intense emotionality 
directly at odds with the notably detached and objective style of his later writings. Further, this 
emotionality is exceptionally personal; his lamentations relate not just vicariously to those under 
occupation, but also to the memories, opportunities, and experiences that the war was taking 
from Jünger himself.  
This is directly related to the second element: the perceived perpetuity and irrevocability 
of the Great War. Jünger repeatedly bemoaned his fears that what was good in the pre-war world 
might be irretrievable after the war, all the more so because the war is ‘slowly strangling Europe’ 
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in what felt like a near-endless process—to the point that he repudiated his pre-war ideas of war 
as a positive transformative experience as early as December 1915. This is then driven home in 
an indirect—but no less poignant—manner when Jünger returns his attention to the practical 
matters at hand: the impending receipt of new rifles, signaling a return to battle in the front lines, 
necessitated the cessation of his more remote emotional and philosophical reflections.  
Finally, Jünger intimates that his pre-war conception of the role of the war (and possibly 
by extension nationalism) was ‘the same as everyone else’—that of an inherently positive 
transformative experience—but his Kriegserlebnis had robbed that conception of its validity. 
Clearly, concrete practical concerns dominated to the point that it appears by the end of 1915 
Jünger’s national identity was largely paused in this deconstructed state.      
 To be sure, Jünger’s diary also voiced his more militaristic and bloodthirsty aims for his 
experience. He stated in his entry from 3 September 1916—during the battle of the Somme—for 
example, that while “I have now experienced much in this great war…[but] the purpose of my 
war experience…has not been fulfilled”: to fight “man against man, which is something different 
than this eternal artillery war.”113 However, this “war lust” remained periodically tempered, as, 
for example, when Jünger, “sitting in a green meadow” at the end of May 1917 asked himself 
“when will this shitty war end?” and exclaimed in an affecting metaphor that “Spring must come 
sometime!”114 Nonetheless, Jünger endured. By the end of the war, he was a Lieutenant in the 
shock troops, had been wounded fourteen times (by his own count115), and had received not only 
the Iron Cross First Class, but also the Pour le Mérite, Germany’s highest military decoration.116  
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Ultimately, there are two central elements that emerge from this analysis of Jünger’s 
Kriegserlebnis which offer crucial insights into German nationalism during this period. The first 
is the total absence of jingoism in Jünger’s Nationalism, even where Jünger relishes the periods 
of excitement generated during the war and while granting that his experience of the ‘Spirit of 
1914’ and the spontaneous mobilization were likely accurate (although this assessment is based 
on largely circumstantial evidence). This negative definition of national identity—defined by a 
‘lack of’—is in fact the only conception of nationalism Jünger seems to have held during 1914-
1918. Both his diary and the majority of Storm of Steel illustrate the persistent prevalence of 
pragmatic concerns which limited abstract reflection during the war. The war had deconstructed 
his national identity—the pre-war definition was now null and thus it was definition-less—and 
these practical issues precluded any reconstruction of that identity until after the armistice.  
This negative conception is inherently related to the second element, which is ultimately 
more important as it is the principal component in Jünger’s construction of a concrete—i.e. 
positive—definition of nationalism in the years following the war: immense emotional trauma 
based on a deeply empathetic mindset, itself rooted in a strong proclivity for observation and a 
deep hunger for experience.117 While Jünger’s Kriegserlebnis was not one of disillusionment, it 
was one of mammoth emotional intensity, as Jünger salvaged personal triumph out of Germany’s 
national defeat.  
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3.2 POST-WAR REFLECTIONS: POSITIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY DEFINITION, 
1918-1924   
 
It was not until after the war that Jünger articulated his conception of nationalism in positive 
terms, found in the limited number of abstract reflections in the 1924 edition of In 
Stahlgewittern. Jünger mentions in a footnote that the aim of the book “is to deal with the 
experience of the war purely” since he discussed its psychology in War as Inner Experience,118 
which subsequently implied that the philosophical and psychological reflections he included in 
that edition were so central as to necessitate their inclusion in a purely descriptive work. 
 As illustrated above, Jünger began his memoir with a brief recounting of his experience 
and interpretation of the ‘Spirit of 1914’, and this attempt to frame his account in popularly 
accepted nationalist terms persists throughout the book. In fact, at the conclusion of his memoir 
Jünger’s nationalistic faith in Germany is proclaimed to actually have been strengthened by his 
experience during the war, at least according to this recounting. His final lines of Storm of Steel 
profess to the reader his nationalistic faith in a timeless and eternal Germany, already with an eye 
on the future:  
In spite of this [fever] it was not long before we were in excellent form for another winter 
campaign. This was deferred for a while; and we soon had to take part in other battles 
than we ever dreamed. 
Now these too are over, and already we see once more in the dim light of the 
future the tumult of fresh ones. We—by this I mean those youth of this land who are 
capable of enthusiasm for an ideal—will not shirk from them. We stand in the memory of 
the dead who are holy to us and we believe ourselves entrusted with the true and spiritual 
welfare of our people. We stand for what will be and what has been. Though force 
without and barbarity within conglomerate in somber clouds, yet so long as the blade of a 
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sword will strike a spark in the night it may be said: Germany lives and Germany shall 
never go under!”119 
  
Jünger quite blatantly attempted to portray his wartime nationalism as constant and unvarying, in 
contrast (and contradiction) to his actual war diary. Importantly, this narrative directly correlates 
with Richard Bessel’s analysis and description of the mindset and emotional needs of the 
recently demobilized Frontsoldaten,120 as Jünger glossed over his deconstructed national identity 
during the Great War.  
This contradiction is not the central element of Jünger’s concluding reflections on the 
war’s meaning however. That element—alluded to in the passage above—is his avowed belief of 
the Front Generation’s transformation into the guardians of the ‘spiritual welfare’ of the German 
people, and points to the chief components of Jünger’s positive definition of German identity: 
To-day we cannot understand the martyrs who threw themselves into the arena in a 
transport that lifted them even before their deaths beyond humanity…. Their faith no 
longer exercises a compelling force. When once it is no longer possible to understand 
how a man gives his life for his country—and the time will come—then all is over with 
that faith also, and the idea of the fatherland is dead…. For all these great and solemn 
ideas bloom from a feeling that dwells in the blood and cannot be forced. In the cold light 
of reason everything alike is a matter of expedience and sinks to the paltry and mean. It 
was our luck to live in the invisible rays of a feeling that filled the heart, and of this 
inestimable treasure we can never be deprived.121 
 
Three things stand out, all of which, as their intimate proximity indicates, are innately related. 
 The first is, quite simply, the attack on rationalism and nihilism of the kind that would 
later be articulated in Eric Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front.122 Jünger made 
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clear in a single concise sentence that such a conception of the war offered no meaning—no 
explanation—and therefore appeared to him as petty and irrelevant. It was an unviable 
framework through which to interpret the war because it offered no inherent value for his 
experience of the war’s destruction and immense sacrifices it had imposed.  
 The second is the prominent use of religious diction. Implicit in these final ruminations is 
the fact that nationalism functioned as a form of central, internal belief along lines at least 
comparable to those of religion. Nationalism was a faith (a word used explicitly and recurrently) 
that could grant meaning to the world in general and the war in particular. But Jünger’s religious 
nationalism—and religiosity in general—was of a unique color. He does not fit cleanly within 
either of the two main religious trends surrounding the war—the ecumenical ‘sacred nation’ that 
united the fractious masses behind a wartime jingoistic faith,123 nor the post-war increase in 
mourning-related religiosity and spiritualism.124  
Superficially at any rate, Jünger appears to fit within the former group, for whom 
“[b]elief in God and patriotism were usually inseparable; and though this may not mean that 
everyone was a believer…it is clear that spiritual values and their related vocabulary…sustained 
people and their ideas about the war, their beliefs that they were taking part in a true crusade.”125 
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 It is this idea of a crusade, wherein “chosen peoples” were now at war with each other,126 that 
sets Jünger’s nationalism apart. The nation was clearly sacred for Jünger by 1924, but that did 
not, for him, imply a religious imperative to destroy other nations. While his idea of ‘Total 
Mobilization’ (the title of one of Jünger’s essays which would later become the The Worker127) 
and the militaristic necessity of an autocratic state that could stand above the polarized, 
internecine political system associated with the Weimar Republic128 would seem to detract from 
this notion of Jünger’s religiosity as atypical, it is important to note that 1) that idea was not 
developed during the war, but was, according to Martin Travers’ analysis of Conservative 
Revolutionary literature, “articulated through an almost impersonal distance from the immediacy 
of the events described”129 and 2) is concerned with war in-and-of itself more so than with a 
specific enemy nation.130  
Jünger’s nationalistic religiosity was more of a synthesis of the two larger religious 
trends. On the one hand it reflected the faith and belief in the sanctity of the nation, whilst 
simultaneously fulfilling a need to find meaning and, above all, catharsis in its destruction. For 
Jünger, it appeared it was better to live with the belief that all of those who perished and suffered 
through the war’s innumerable horrors died and suffered for some great ideal, some great nation, 
Germany, than to founder in the cold harshness of  nihilism and believe that their lives and 
deaths held no meaning at all.  
 The final element is the most important, as it is the culmination of the previous two: the 
internal manifestation of nationalism. As elucidated above, both Jünger’s war diary, In 
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Stahlgewittern, and even ‘Total Mobilization’ lack any form of hostility towards enemy nations. 
Jünger held a great deal of respect for both the French and the British, and—this being the 
essential point—saw them as having an equally legitimate right to this internal sense of national 
pride; of the manifestation of the socio-cultural and intrinsically communal and fraternal 
phenomenon of Nationalism131 as an internal feeling, but never to the point of blindness or 
antagonism. In this sense, it is clear that Jünger’s community of experience was perceived as a 
much more capacious one, as it was not limited to the German nation, but was applicable to—
and intended for—all frontline soldiers in all the belligerent nations; a template for Nationalism’s 
proper sphere: 
It has always been my ideal in war to eliminate all feelings of hatred and to treat my 
enemy as an enemy only in battle and to honour him as a man according to his courage. It 
is exactly in this that I have found many kindred souls among British officers. It depends, 
of course, on not letting oneself be blinded by an excessive national feeling, as the case 
generally is between the French and the Germans. The consciousness of the importance of 
one’s own nation ought to reside as a matter of course and unobtrusively in everybody, 
just as an unconditional sense of honour does in a gentleman.132   
 
Importantly, Jünger’s framework was unique in that it was not only non-aggressive, but also non-
defensive: this nationalism template was instead primarily sporting and internationally fraternal.  
Finally, this begs the broader question as to the construction of this internal conception of 
national identity. In this regard, the first essential point to note is again that Jünger’s internal 
nationalism overtly fulfills an emotional need, i.e. catharsis, unsurprising given the emotional 
intensity of Jünger’s Kriegserlebnis. At this point the issue of chronology—the second point—
becomes crucial. Despite Jünger’s professed experience of having been carried into the First 
World War on a wave of nationalist feeling, he did not reconstruct his national identity during 
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the conflict: his positive conception of nationalism was not articulated until after the armistice. 
Both of these elements were forthrightly stated in Jünger’s elderly reflections on his younger 
self: 
I would never say that I was completely wrong. Quite the opposite: a man has to be 
capable of respecting his own history. I genuinely like that young man, even though I feel 
very removed from him. During World War I, I reacted a lot more passionately, as did 
everyone else, in France and England too. All young men are prey to violent emotions. 
Why should anyone back away from it now at any price? Today it would be dreadful to 
insist that that enthusiasm led to nothing. I’m perfectly aware of it, but I would still like 
to pat those young men on the back.  
I became a nationalist purely under French influence, especially by reading Barrѐs 
right after World War I. Barrѐs was truly enthralling. He was the one who said “I am not 
national, I am a nationalist.” I instantly made those sentiments my own. Actually, what 
they did was to reactivate a great historical orientation—namely, the influence of the 
French Revolution on the German situation. The wars of liberation were made possible 
only by the phenomenon of Napoleon.133 
 
 
In summation, the evolution of Jünger’s nationalism appears to be an example of the process 
implied in coupling Rouzeau and Becker’s dictum with the analysis of Eric Leed (discussed 
below): a process of identity deconstruction during the war, necessitating a process of 
reconstruction afterwards. But it is also clear that while the internal manifestation was unique, 
the vehicle—Nationalism—was not freely chosen: it was optimal because it was both deeply pre-
conditioned prior to the war (as it was for the majority of Europeans) and popularly acceptable 
afterwards. Further, from a more pragmatic perspective, this post-war acceptability had other 
potential benefits for the young author by creating the possibility of an international readership, 
which Storm of Steel garnered by 1929.134 
As Leed asserts, war is an inherently disruptive and abnormal event which only a 
minority of any given society can understand in any truly vicarious way, and one which innately 
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produced an identity discontinuity even before any consideration of emotional trauma; the 
reestablishment of identity continuity became the central psychological project of most (if not 
all) combat veterans returning from the trenches,135 and Jünger was no exception. Thus it 
becomes clear that Thomas Nevin’s characterization of Jünger as a detached and emotionally 
cold individual whose “distancing even from himself is not only a capacity; it is a disposition 
which suggests his great difficulty in establishing any deep emotional relationships with 
anyone”136 only holds true for the Jünger that emerged from the  inferno of the First World War. 
 Spurred by a restless adventurousness coupled with the ‘Spirit of 1914’, Jünger plunged 
headlong into World War I, coming face to face with the war’s brutality in a physical, 
psychological, cultural, and emotional sense. Throughout the war years, Jünger displayed a 
marked lack of nationalist hostility and an abundance of empathy, while the practical burdens of 
the Great War precluded any deeper overt reflection on—and therefore reconstruction of—his 
national identity. It was only in the years following the war that Jünger articulated his form of 
internal nationalism which could (at least partially) fill that emotional void. As Robert Wohl 
intimates in his summary of Jünger’s ideas, these nationalistic sentiments illustrated a need for a 
dual catharsis, on both a national and individual level: 
[T]he lessons the war had to teach could be learned even better in defeat than in victory. 
For in the depths of his despair the German soldier had…come to know and worship the 
nation. He had come to realize the I was nothing and that the we…was everything…. No 
one had died in vain. The English, French, and Germans had all been working toward…a 
new mode of life.137 
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By transforming themselves internally into guardians of the national spirit, the Frontsoldaten of 
all nations could become the ‘new men’ to rebuild Europe as a collection of collectivistic, 
gentlemanly nation states; an inherently cathartic reconstruction of national identity.  
 46 
4.0  RESOLVING AMBIVALENCE: HERMANN HESSE’S COMPETING 
IDENTITIES 
Hermann Hesse’s experience of the war was in many ways the polar opposite of Jünger’s. Hesse 
was thirty-seven years old and had already achieved a moderate degree of literary success by the 
outbreak of hostilities. Not only did he see none of the ‘action’ of the war firsthand, but spent the 
war as a German citizen in a foreign, neutral country, living in Bern, Switzerland.138 When 
hostilities broke out in the August 1914, Hesse’s political views were ambiguous, as he was 
largely uninterested in politics prior to its start.139 This ambiguity was in fact masking a profound 
sense of ambivalence,140 and the intellectual biography of Hesse’s war experience is the story of 
resolving this ambivalence—the competition between his nationalism on the one hand, and his 
internationalism and pacifism on the other.  
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4.1 INTERNATIONALIST SENTIMENTS AND NATIONAL LOYALTIES, 1914-1915 
 
 
With the outbreak of hostilities, there was a profound ‘mobilization of morale’, as newspapers, 
intellectuals, and artists rallied in defense of German Kultur,141 alongside more official 
government measures—one of the most prominent being censorship—in the attempt to frame the 
war in defensive terms and therefore mobilize the populace psychologically and emotionally.142 
In this regard Hesse was unique in that he was, from the outset, critical of this nationalistic 
outpouring.  
 Beginning with his first essay on the subject, “O Friends, Not These Tones!”—written in 
September 1914 and published two months later—Hesse responded directly to the jingoistic 
nature of the cultural mobilization. In Hesse’s view, the danger of Nationalism was exactly such 
a mobilization: it was destroying culture and art by fueling feelings of hatred and resentment 
among people of different nationalities. As he stated in his essay, “A lovely Japanese fairy tale, a 
good French novel…must now be passed over in silence…because a few Japanese ships are 
attacking [the German colony] Tsingtao.” Further, this cultural destruction was being carried out 
by “neutrals”—“all those who as scientists, teachers, artists, and men of letters are engaged in the 
labors of peace and humanity”—who “participate in the great events by carrying the war into 
their studies and writing bloodthirsty war songs or rabid articles fomenting hatred among 
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nations.”143 Hesse is particularly hostile to academics and artists whose convictions changed at 
the outset of the war; those who hopped onto the nationalist bandwagon, riding on the perceived 
wave of nationalist rapture and abandoned their convictions once they became inconvenient: “all 
those others who were more or less consciously at work on the supranational edifice of human 
culture and have now suddenly decided to carry the war into the realm of the spirit—what they 
are doing is wrong and grotesquely unreasonable.”144  
Hesse wanted to hold academics, artists and men of letters to a higher standard than the 
common soldier whose “mental laziness” he excused.145  As Hesse saw it, their role should be to 
promote an idealistic, peaceful European society, not the perpetuation of traditional national 
animosities. Those who were intellectually superior must be above common emotion: “it 
becomes incumbent to preserve an area of peace, to strike bridges, to look for ways, but not to 
lash out (with our pens!) and still further demolish the foundations of Europe’s future.”146 
Such sentiments would seem to point toward a very overt internationalist leaning. 
However, Hesse very deliberately framed his essay with patriotic proclamations. In the opening 
paragraph, he stated “I am a German, my sympathies and aspirations belong to Germany” before 
proceeding to his critiques.147 He completed this nationalistic frame at the conclusion of those 
initial criticisms, in an attempt to portray his national loyalty as an essential qualifier to his 
commentary: “These words, it goes without saying, are not directed against patriotic sentiment or 
love of country. I am the last man to foreswear my country at a time like this, nor would it occur 
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to me to deter a soldier from doing his duty. Since shooting is the order of the day, let there be 
shooting.”148   
Moreover, these nationalistic proclamations do not appear to be merely pragmatic tools to 
avert criticism, but opinions that Hesse genuinely held. First and foremost, Hesse attempted to 
join the German army twice—once at the German consulate in Bern, once in Stuttgart—but was 
rejected due to his poor eyesight and family issues surrounding his schizophrenic wife.149 
Second, an examination of Hesse’s private correspondence illustrates that he harbored an even 
greater degree of nationalism in private than his first public essay let on. In a letter to his father 
from 9 September 1914, he not only displays a genuine emotional loyalty and attachment to 
Germany, but also a strong degree of cultural hostility towards both England and Russia: 
If one could only foresee the course of the war and its outcome! The alliances and vested 
interests are so entangled that nothing seems certain; all of Europe will have to suffer the 
consequences, except perhaps for England, which is watching closely in the hope of 
making a profit. Although I love many English people dearly and respect others highly, I 
think that, morally speaking, they’re in a downright miserable predicament as a people. 
But it’s consoling to see so many well-intentioned Englishmen speaking out against these 
despicable policies. In the meantime, half of Germany is bleeding to death, and France is 
being ruined; the English certainly won’t pay any damages. Since things are so desperate, 
one can only hope for news of a rebellion breaking out in India, or some terrible 
misfortune befalling the English fleet. If that were to happen, and if Austria can somehow 
keep going, then Germany could play the leading role at the peace negotiations, and in 
that case there would be some hope for life and culture in the immediate future. 
Otherwise, England would end up on top, and Europe would then be in the hands of those 
moneybags and illiterate Russians, and if we wanted to safeguard our most sacred values, 
we would have to initiate a kind of secret cult. But, personally, I have a lot of faith in 
Germany, and even if the other dreams never come true, this enormous upheaval will 
eventually prove beneficial for us, in spite of the victims. A stronger Russia and a 
seriously weakened France would be terrible news for everybody. It is awful to think that 
this big war will probably victimize those who least deserve that fate. I like both the 
Russians and the English, and feel close to them as a people, but have political and 
cultural reasons for hoping they don’t grow more powerful.150 
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Ironically, it appears that Hesse not only was unique for his early criticism, but also for going 
beyond the resigned acceptance with which most Europeans greeted the outbreak of war, 
privately feeling that which be publicly decried against: a culturally chauvinistic German 
nationalism, with at least a modicum of hostility. Hesse’s letter appears as something of a 
structural foil of “O Friends, Not These Tones!” wherein he framed his nationalistic critiques of 
England and Russia with internationalist professions of his love and respect for them, a subtle 
indication of the depth of this ambivalence.  
These conflicting sentiments do appear to have been resolved by Hesse to some extent—
at least intellectually—early in the war, most clearly demonstrated in his description of Goethe, 
his ideal intellectual man: “Goethe was never wanting as a patriot…but his devotion to humanity 
meant more to him than his devotion to the German people, which he knew and loved better than 
anyone else.” 151 Hesse appeared to see himself (or at least wanted to see himself) in the same 
way that he described Goethe, as “a citizen and patriot of the international world of thought,”  
membership in which did not mean the abandonment of the German nation.152 Nationalism 
merely occupied a lower wrung on the intellectual and identity hierarchy, as he clarified to a 
musical friend in a letter from 26 December 1914: “[e]ven though I feel very German, I have 
always considered nationalism an elementary form of education, an introductory course in ideal 
humanity. I have never relished the thought of nationalism as a goal in itself.”153   
At the same time however, Hesse was acutely aware of the ambivalence of his attitudes 
and the competitive nature of his loyalties, evidenced in a letter to a friend from 10 November 
1914: 
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The war has put me in a somewhat awkward position. Although I feel that I’m on 
Germany’s side and can understand the all-consuming nationalistic fervor that has taken 
hold there, I’m not a completely enthusiastic participant in this development. I live 
abroad, and thus at some remove from the origins of the acute psychosis; I cannot quite 
get over what happened to Belgium; my family origins have shaped my outlook, and my 
own experience has become so cosmopolitan that I would seem somewhat suspect in the 
eyes of a pure patriot…. [E]ver since my childhood, I have regarded Switzerland as my 
second homeland, although only the German part. I also feel like traveling and getting to 
know the literatures of foreign countries. Germany now sees little point in behaving 
decently and exercising restraint; war calls for a severe state of psychosis or even mania. 
I fail to see anything delightful or splendid in this war, and don’t anticipate a rosy future 
afterward. As soon as the war is over, we shall have to become better friends with 
England and France than we were in prewar days; I feel that will prove indispensable in 
the future, and would have come about more easily without the war. Now we shall have 
to pay for the miserable policies of France, the envy of the English, and our own political 
mistakes; Austria, Belgium, and France are also bleeding. There is no point trying to 
identify the ‘guilty’ party; each side needs to believe that it is in the right. The whole 
thing is just a pathetic scrap about values that are far from clear cut. The war has created 
a wonderful spirit of unity and self-sacrifice in Germany, but the same applies to the 
enemy. It’s easy enough for those of us who have stayed at home to say that a war which 
has created that sort of atmosphere is worthwhile. But those who are rotting in the woods, 
those whose cities, villages, fields, and aspirations have been ravaged and destroyed do 
not agree, and I cannot think about the war without hearing those voices.154  
 
In addition to illustrating the ambivalent conflict between Hesse’s communal identities, this 
letter also provides two important insights into the source of that ambivalence. First, it is clear 
that at least one of the chief roots was Hesse’s feeling of holding an inadequate amount of 
nationalism—certainly not enough to insulate him from criticism—as opposed to a differing 
definition of it. This is particularly ironic in that the second noteworthy element is Hesse’s use of 
the word “enemy”: a concise embodiment of his common nationalistic prejudices—which 
appears very much in line with the very kind of nationalism he felt himself to lack—that 
Germany would be forced “to pay for the miserable policies of France” and “the envy of the 
English”. 
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Despite this contradiction, Hesse proved to be quite perceptive. He was subject to a rather 
ignorant and misinformed criticism from ultra-nationalists—based mostly on taking private 
remarks out of context—starting in the fall of 1915.155 This came after he had authored a 
decidedly chauvinistic introduction for a battlefront pamphlet titled ‘To Victory’, published on 
14 March 1915, where Hesse seemed to align himself even more with the more official 
nationalistic line—a clear illustration of the baselessness of the criticisms he faced: “We no 
longer want to be that poor ideal Germany that had many poets and thinkers but no money and 
no power and no voice in world affairs. We intend to be part of the action in the future.”156  
He did appear to back away from this more jingoistic position rather quickly however. In 
two open letters from 23 October and 1 November 1915—written in response to this 
misinterpretive criticism—Hesse largely returned to the position he had taken in “O Friends, Not 
These Tones!” He explained the source of their misunderstanding in an attempt to clarify his 
position; defended himself against the charge of “draft dodging”, pointing out that “I did try to 
enlist in the late summer of 1914” and upon his rejection had been working in an official, 
government-sanctioned capacity to aid German POWs; and even invited his critics to spend a 
week with him in Bern “so they can examine our work in a neutral country, especially our labor 
of love on behalf of the prisoners.”157  
This work with prisoners was in many ways a concrete manifestation of Hesse’s 
ambivalent nationalism. As Lewis Tuskin summarizes, “Hesse’s activities…proved his German 
loyalties—as he understood them—and took the form of sympathy for the common soldier.” 
However, as Tuskin goes on to point out these “were universal, humanitarian efforts to remind 
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those same German soldiers that there was a higher life and higher meaning beyond battlefield 
and fatherland.”158 
 
4.2 DISILLUSIONMENT AND TRANSCENDENCE, 1916-1919 
 
These ambivalent sentiments persisted until late 1915/early 1916, when a number of 
personal crises, coupled with the continuation and intensification of the war, produced a 
profound sense of disillusionment in Hesse. His tireless labors for the POWs, as well as the 
attacks from the nationalist press continued. In addition, Hesse was attacked by pacifists almost 
as vehemently as he was from the nationalists, this time for his lack of faith in their organized 
effort’s realistic possibilities for ending the war.159 Then, early in 1916, Hesse’s father died, 
while at the same time his wife’s schizophrenia worsened, eventually culminating in her 
institutionalization. This combination of pressures eventually led Hesse to revert into a life of 
isolation and solitude, and eventually to begin psychoanalytic treatments with Dr. Josef Lang, a 
young Jungian disciple, which continued into 1917.160 
 Hesse discussed this increasing introversion in a letter to an old friend from 18 May 
1916, which demonstrates that his internal ambivalence was becoming increasingly untenable: 
I too may be approaching a crisis…[b]ut these physical ailments are not very significant, 
since most of them are merely symptoms of an inner malaise, a process of dissolution, 
which has been going on inside me for years, and has now reached a stage where it will 
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erupt, and a solution has to be found, otherwise it would be pointless continuing. I have 
no idea where this path is heading—it will either lead back to the ‘world’ or make me 
even more isolated and withdrawn. At the moment, I feel that my once lively instincts 
and thought processes are shriveling; something new is germinating, it’s still indistinct, 
and I feel greater anxiety than joy. The painful pressures exerted by that awful war have 
actually quickened this growth.161 
 
Hesse felt that the onset of this disillusionment and internal crisis was not spontaneous, but was 
1) the culmination of a process years in the making which 2) was firmly rooted in—or was at the 
very least accelerated and intensified by—the cultural, emotional and psychological crisis of the 
First World War. Perhaps most important is the subtle indication that Hesse had begun to divorce 
himself from his previous feelings of German-ness; the war was no longer ‘ours’, but was instead 
‘that awful war’—some malevolent external force to which Hesse felt no personal connection. 
To this end, it is clear that by the conclusion of 1916 Hesse’s patience for the vociferous 
nationalists in Germany had begun to wane. He stated in a letter from Christmas Day 1916, for 
example, that “[t]hose ranting barbarians we have to listen to nowadays allege that our prewar 
lives were absolutely sybaritic and emotionally vapid, whereas now we are again faced with real 
life and genuine emotions. How stupid and deceitful!”162  
 This ‘inner malaise’ and increasing disgust and despondency towards the external world 
continued throughout 1917. Hesse wrote to the Austrian man of letters Felix Braun on 7 June 
that “[t]he war has put me in an awful situation, which is fraught with inner turmoil, a situation I 
can neither describe nor turn into literature.” Further, his retreat into introversion had intensified: 
“Although the war has changed the way I—and indeed everybody else—relate to the world, it 
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hasn’t made a political animal out of me. Quite the opposite. I see the line dividing the inner and 
outer worlds even more clearly than usual, and am interested solely in the former.”163 
 In August, Hesse published an essay titled “To a Cabinet Minister” in which he openly 
criticized the ‘official’ nationalism of the Imperial German government, but without the 
nationalistic adornments of his earlier writings from the first two years of the war:  
Reduced to the essentials, [the minister’s speech] said roughly what government officials 
have been saying in their speeches for a long time: that… ‘we’ long for nothing so 
fervently as peace, as a new understanding among nations and fruitful collaboration in 
building the future, that we wish neither to enrich ourselves nor to satisfy homicidal 
lusts—but that the ‘time for negotiations’ is not yet at hand and that for the present there 
is therefore no alternative but to go on bravely waging war. Just about every minister of 
any of the belligerent nations might have made such a speech…. 
Your speech shows a profound feeling of concern and responsibility for your 
people, its army, and its honor. But it shows no feeling for mankind. And, to put it 
bluntly, it implies hundreds of thousands more human sacrifices.164 
 
Once more, and this time publicly, Hesse implied his detachment from Germany—“your people, 
its army, and its honor”—but had now reversed himself from his previous sentiment from 
September 1914 that ‘since shooting is the order of the day, let there be shooting’ and directly 
asserted that jingoistic speeches were simply encouraging the continuance of mass murder. 
Hesse’s national identity, rather than being deconstructed (offering the possibility for 
reconstruction and redefinition), was instead becoming devalued as Hesse’s initial definition of 
nationalism remained unaltered. 
 This devaluation—and the recanting of his earlier nationalistic sentiments—continued 
throughout 1917 and 1918, while at the same time his focus continued to shift from macroscopic 
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concerns of the ‘outer’ world to the microscopic concerns of the inner individual.165 This, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, coincided with an expansion and increase in value of his internationalist 
identity, as he described in a short letter to Romain Rolland from 4 August: “I have failed in my 
attempt to introduce love into political matters. I don’t consider ‘Europe’ an ideal. While people 
continue killing one another, under European leadership, I remain suspicious of all such 
divisions between human beings. I don’t believe in Europe, but rather in humanity.”166 
Further emblematic of this shift is his adoption of a pseudonym—Emil Sinclair—
beginning in 1917. This moniker insulated Hesse against further criticism, but also guaranteed 
that his newly-evolving message would be read in a less biased manner, since “[h]is name had 
become a liability.”167 Given this fact, his new pseudonym would allow Hesse to maintain—or at 
least better maintain—his weight within the intellectual field of German Nationalism. 
 A short dystopian story published under this pseudonym from late 1917, “If the War 
Goes on Another Two Years”, wherein Sinclair (also the first-person protagonist of the story) 
quite literally separates his soul from his earthly body only to return to a 1920 where the war is 
still continuing, appears to be a final transitional piece as Hesse edged ever closer to resolving 
his identity ambivalence. His description of this dystopia is both overtly biting and startlingly 
prophetic, elucidating the contradictions of official justifications for the war, but also 
foreshadowing the even more total nature of 1939-1945: 
Great progress had been made towards equality. In Europe at least…all countries looked 
the same…. Since the introduction of bombing from free balloons, which automatically 
dropped their bombs on the civilian population from an altitude of fifty to sixty thousand 
feet, national boundaries, though closely guarded as ever, had become rather illusory. The 
dispersion of these bombs, dropped at random from the sky, was so great that the balloon 
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commands were quite content if their explosive showers had spared their own country—
how many had landed on neutral or even allied territory had become a matter of 
indifference. 
This was the only real progress the art of warfare had made; here at last the 
character of this war had found a clear expression. The world was divided into two 
parties which were trying to destroy each other because they both wanted the same thing, 
the liberation of the oppressed, the abolition of violence, and the establishment of a 
lasting peace. On both sides there was a strong sentiment against any peace that might not 
last forever—if eternal peace was not to be had, both parties were resolutely committed 
to eternal war.168 
 
This astounding sense of hypocrisy now had clearly become brutally apparent to Hesse, and his 
recognition of it appears to be the final step in the repudiation of his earlier notion and 
(admittedly loose) alignment with the official nationalist ideology. As the story progresses, 
Sinclair is found to be out for a walk without permission, lacking identification papers, has 
leather shoes which are forbidden for civilians (and are subsequently confiscated) and is 
informed that he is not even allowed to die without the permission of the state: he would have to 
purchase a “demise card” for 4,000 gulden. The story concludes with Sinclair again abandoning 
his earthly body and wandering off to another spiritual world.169  
 This resolution via a focus on the personal inner spirit—vaguely formulated in “If the 
War Goes on Another Two Years”—was finally articulated in a more concrete form late in 1917 
in Hesse’s one major literary work from this period (also initially published under his Emil 
Sinclair pseudonym), the short novel Demian: The Story of Emil Sinclair’s Youth, written in a 
few frenzied weeks in the fall of 1917 and later published in 1919.170 While the majority of 
Demian does not deal overtly with the war, it conveyed—in a subtle, literary fashion—what 
                                                 
168 Hermann Hesse, “If the War Goes on Another Two Years”, in If the War Goes on... Reflections on War and 
Politics, 1949. Trans. by Ralph Manheim (New York: The Noonday Press, 1971): 21.  
169 Ibid., 20-28. 
170 What follows is a very short analysis with an intentionally narrow focus on Demian’s relation to Hesse’s 
communal identity conception(s). For more holistic and literary analyses of Demian, see Mileck, Hermann Hesse, 
88-100; Tuskin, Understanding Hermann Hesse, 84-97. 
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Hesse saw as the optimal means for positive societal transformation: personal, individuated 
transcendence.171 The conclusion of Demian, when the protagonist—again, Emil Sinclair—is 
sent to the front, concisely articulated both the direct relationship between Hesse’s conception of 
personal transcendence and the Great War, but also Hesse’s ultimate conclusion about wartime 
nationalism. Consequently, it is worth quoting at length: 
All men seemed to have become brothers—overnight. They talked of ‘the fatherland’ and 
of ‘honor’, but what lay behind it was their own fate whose unveiled face they had now 
all beheld for one brief moment. Young men left their barracks, were packed onto trains, 
and on many faces I saw a sign—not ours—but a beautiful, dignified sign nonetheless 
that meant love and death. I, too, was embraced by people whom I had never seen before 
and I understood this gesture and responded to it. Intoxication made them do it, not a 
hankering after their destiny. But this intoxication was sacred, for it was the result of their 
all having thrown that brief, terribly disquieting glance into the eyes of their fate.  
 It was nearly winter when I was sent to the front. Despite the excitement of being 
under fire for the first time, in the beginning everything disappointed me. At one time I 
had given much thought to why men were so rarely capable of living for an ideal. Now I 
saw that many, no, all men were capable of dying for one. Yet it could not be a personal, 
a freely chosen ideal; it had to be mutually accepted.  
 As time went on though I realized I had underestimated these men. However 
much mutual service and danger made a uniform mass of them, I still saw many approach 
the will of fate with great dignity. Many, very many, not only during the attack but at 
every moment of the day, wore in their eyes the remote, resolute, somewhat possessed 
look which knows nothing of aims and signified complete surrender to the incredible. 
Whatever they might think or believe, they were ready, they were the clay of which the 
future could be shaped. The more single-mindedly the world concentrated on war and 
heroism, on honor and other old ideas, the more remote and improbable any whisper of 
genuine humanity sounded—that was all just surface, in the same way that the question 
of the war’s external and political objectives remained superficial. Deep down, 
underneath, something was taking shape. Something akin to a new humanity. For I could 
see many men—and many died beside me—who had begun to feel acutely that hatred 
and rage, slaughter and annihilation were not bound up with these objectives. No, these 
objectives and aims were completely fortuitous. The most primitive, even the wildest 
feelings were not directed at the enemy; their bloody task was merely an irradiation of the 
soul, of the soul divided within itself, which filled men with the lust to rage and kill, 
annihilate and die so that they might be born anew.172   
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Hesse had redefined Nationalism: it was no longer an identity, but a vehicle to internal 
transformation—a striking parallel with Jünger. For all of its horror, the war—facilitated by the 
belligerence and hatred of jingoists—was an opportunity for spiritual rebirth: the birth of a ‘new 
humanity’ which would no longer be co-opted by the divisive, violent, and selfish concerns that 
had dominated men in the pre-war world.  In this way, Hesse was able to unite his previously 
competing identities without constructing (or reconstructing) an alternate conception of 
nationalism, but through a re-appropriation of nationalism in such a way that it could now serve 
positive ends, as he defined them. Most importantly, Hesse’s idea of nationalism as a 
transformational vehicle—given his profound disillusionment—clearly fulfills the same cathartic 
needs as Jünger’s post-war conception of internal nationalism: a parallel in both form and 
function.  
It remains something of an irony that despite this newfound resolution, Hesse’s 
conception of the German nation remained static throughout the war and always seemed to 
follow the chauvinists’ conception. In an essay titled “The Reich” from December 1918, for 
example, Hesse utilized one of the most common nationalist tropes—that of “a modular, 
‘continuous’ awakening from a chronologically gauged, A.D. –style slumber” for “a guaranteed 
return to an aboriginal essence [of the nation]”173—not just in his characterization German 
unification,174 but in his own call for Germany’s spiritual transformation: 
[The Reich] cannot return to childhood…. But it can take the path which an individual 
must take when his life has led him into error and deep torment. It can recollect its past, 
                                                 
173 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 
Verso, 2nd Ed., 2006): 195.  
174 Hermann Hesse, “The Reich”, in If the War Goes on... Reflections on War and Politics, 1949. Trans. by Ralph 
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its origin and childhood, its greatness, its glory and its defeat, and through this 
recollection find the strength which is inherent in it and can never be lost. As the pious 
say, it must ‘look within.’ And deep within itself it will find intact its own innermost 
being which will not try to evade its destiny but embrace it and, building on what is best 
and most essential in itself, make a fresh start, 
If this happens and if this hard-pressed nation willingly and honestly travels the 
path of destiny, something of what was will be reborn.175  
  
Once again, the parallels with Jünger (particularly the conclusion to the 1924 edition of Storm of 
Steel)—the inherent and immutable strength of the German nation, the need for internal spiritual 
transformation and transcendence—are compellingly prominent.  
 Hesse continued to write and expand on his ideas of the need for personal transcendence 
and transformation in a number of short essays, stories, and articles throughout 1918 and 1919, 
but never fundamentally redefined them.176 His last major work from this period was the short 
story, first published anonymously in 1919, “Zarathustra’s Return: A Word to German Youth”, 
wherein Nietzsche’s preacher of the Übermensch (‘Overman’)177 returned to Germany to guide 
youth from the folly of belligerent nationalism and toward his ideas of inner transcendence. As 
he stated in the preface to the first signed edition, “[t]here was once a German spirit, a German 
courage, a German manhood that did not express themselves in the uproar of the herd or in mass 
enthusiasm”; Nietzsche was the last embodiment of this spirit who “became an anti-patriot and 
an anti-German.” Hesse’s goal was, simply enough, “to remind the young German intellectuals  
of that man…and in doing so turn their minds away from the herd outcry…to a few simple facts 
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and experiences of the soul.”178 By 1919, Hesse no longer sought to speak to his own personal 
community of experience but, ironically enough, to Jünger’s. His choice to directly allude to the 
Nietzschean Übermensch was very deliberate—copies of Also sprach Zarathustra had been 
distributed to around 150,000 German soldiers179 and thus he attempted to communicate not only 
through a popular and familiar figure, but also one who’s original message was one of 
transformation and transcendence—and once more, there is a marked parallel with Jünger: 
Hesse’s ‘new men’ not only filled the same need (catharsis) and utilized the same vehicle 
(internal spiritual transformation) but were actually exactly the same as Jünger’s—the educated 
youths who had emerged intact from the human furnace of World War I.  
 
Hesse’s wartime experience with Nationalism was one of communal identity competition and 
resolution. Almost from the moment of the war’s outbreak, Hesse felt himself a man apart as his 
German loyalties vied in a fierce internal conflict with his more idealistic, cosmopolitan, and 
pacifistic ideas. Over the course of the war however, Hesse never reconstructed his German 
identity nor really even examined his definition of it and essentially allowed the loudest and most 
prominent chauvinistic voices in Germany to define it for him. Instead, he resolved his identity 
conflict in a more round-about way by first devaluing his nationalism vis-à-vis his cosmopolitan 
humanitarianism, then co-opting that nationalism as a transformative means to internationalist 
and humanitarian ends to ultimately achieve a sense of catharsis about the war. The finality of 
this cathartic resolution is in fact a final conspicuous parallel with Jünger. Hesse’s foreword to 
the first edition of his ‘reflections on war and politics’—published immediately after the Second 
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World War in 1946—makes no mention of Hesse’s initial ambivalence nor the chauvinistic 
nature of his nationalism during 1914-1915.180 It appears that Hesse, rather than recall and 
recognize the difference between the man he was in 1914 and the man he was from 1916 on, 
preferred to forget that painful ambivalence, as it could serve no constructive emotional purpose 
for him after his internationalism and humanism had triumphed in his internal identity struggle.  
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5.0  PARALLEL EXPERIENCES: NATIONAL IDENTITY, EMOTIONAL 
DYNAMICS, AND THE TRANSFORMATIONAL MENTALITY 
 
Fitting these intellectual biographies within the context of World War I illustrates quite 
clearly that Jünger and Hesse’s experiences of and ideas about nationalism are parallel, and the 
adjective parallel is of particular significance. Despite having thoroughly different experiences of 
the First World War, Jünger and Hesse ran parallel not just in the more obvious sense of 
simultaneous temporal occurrence,181 but in both an ideational and functional sense: both co-
opted nationalism in an attempt to find catharsis and meaning in a conflict which wrought death 
and destruction on such an unprecedented scale. The difference between their views of 
nationalism—and what increasingly appears as the primary dichotomy between the two—is not 
whether nationalism was part of that catharsis but the normative ends it was to serve. Jünger 
found catharsis in his view of the nation as the positive entity that would subsume the 
individualistic concerns of its members once they came to know it through the experience of 
such an intense national exertion, i.e. the war; Hesse found meaning in the destruction of the war 
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wrought by nationalism as a means to create a more unified human and European destiny, 
undivided by nationalist preoccupations, once the folly of such divisions had been so violently 
demonstrated. But both came to view the First World War as both a beginning and an end: the 
birth pains of a new Europe. In many ways it is completely understandable why each co-opted 
nationalism in the ways that they did.  
 Jünger experienced, first-hand, the mechanized apocalypse that was the First World War. 
The fact that 1) he advocated nationalism as something internal and natural which 2) was not 
belligerent or xenophobic or even inherently violent in nature is a testament to its serving some 
higher purpose than German war aims. Furthermore, the political conclusions he drew from his 
war experiences in the Weimar years reflect that first-hand experience of the first truly 
mechanized total war182 where he saw the true power of nations, like America, who were totally 
mobilized, and the failure of nations, like Germany, which could not live up to that new task.183  
But again, the chronology of this development is essential. While apparently holding a 
transformational view of war prior to 1914, Jünger’s sense of communal—and likely also 
personal—identity was deconstructed relatively quickly and persisted in that state until at least 
1918; it was only after the war that it was reconstructed with his ideal of internal nationalism, 
and only then that he fully embraced the idea of war as a positive transformative experience.  
Further, this conception of nationalism did appear to endure throughout the Weimar 
years. Perhaps what is most instructive to Jünger’s true feelings about nationalism is the fact that 
he deleted the strong nationalist ending from the third edition of Storm of Steel, published in 
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1934, because Nationalism had become de-facto property of the NSDAP.184 The Nazi nationalist 
ideal was no longer the naturalized internal experience advocated by Jünger, and it seems it was 
important to distance his own nationalistic ideas from those of the Nazis who were attempting to 
co-opt him.185 
Hesse’s wartime writings provide the counter point, in the more musical sense, to Jünger. 
Instead of dealing with physical destruction by shells and bullets, he witnessed the cultural 
destruction of artists, academics, and intellectuals who forsook their beliefs to feed the 
nationalist leviathan that was (in Hesse’s view) destroying Europe. In addition, he had the time 
for reflection during the war—not afforded to Jünger—that, when coupled with the (second-
hand) knowledge of Europe’s physical destruction and the (first-hand) knowledge of the 
intellectual and cultural destruction, enabled him to muse on and find some higher intellectual 
meaning in such thorough Armageddon.  
Further, perhaps the most striking difference between Hesse and Jünger is Hesse’s round-
about identity evolution. Possibly as a result of not seeing combat, none of Hesse’s communal 
identities—national or otherwise—appear to have been deconstructed or de-defined. Rather, 
Hesse manipulated the value of those identities while holding their definitions constant, 
decreasing his appraisal of his German identity before re-appropriating it to fulfill his emotional 
needs.  
 As this comparative analysis demonstrates, both Jünger and Hesse’s ideational evolutions 
mirror the larger emotional dynamics of the conflict. But these dynamics varied by experiential 
community—Frontsoldaten, particularly Kriegsfreiwillige, on the one hand, established artists 
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and intellectuals on the other—and this largely accounts for the differing chronologies. While 
Jünger follows the Frontsoldaten dynamic almost to a T, Hesse’s disillusionment once again put 
him in a form of proto-vanguard as he experienced somewhat prematurely what the rest of the 
German nation experienced in earnest after the war was lost. This appears to be the result, 
however, of the onset of personal crises—the death of his father, the constant attacks from both 
right and left, his wife’s increasing (literal) psychosis—more-so than as a result of the fortunes of 
the war.  
In a more phenomenological sense, this illustrates the importance of—and need for—a 
more overt focus on the inherent emotionality of Nationalism. While Nationalism’s emotional 
nature was identified more than thirty years ago, discussions of that emotionality are often subtle 
and somewhat back-handed: it is rare to see it discussed in a blatant and completely clear way. 
As this study illustrates, myriad important new insights can be gleaned by this broader shift in 
focus in addition to the more limited ones elucidated here.  
 Finally, this study intimates a last, larger phenomenological insight, with the imperative 
qualification that it is extremely tentative. How Jünger and Hesse—utilizing totally differing 
processes and experiencing the war in completely different ways—reached almost the exact 
same empirical conclusion about Nationalism while having it fulfill the same function by the 
same method is something of a quandary, as it does not appear that they ever communicated, 
either directly or indirectly.186 Thus, in closing, I would like to offer a speculative and 
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preliminary answer to this question by proposing a ‘structure’, for lack of a better, preceding the 
tabula rasa of identity187: a transformational mentality.  
It was Jünger—perhaps by benefit of his much longer life—that seemed to subtly 
intimate this mentality and its characteristics, when asked about his prognosis for the future in 
1986: 
[Today] there are fewer and fewer Christians. They are greatly concerned with all the 
grave material dangers we are now threatened with; whereas, above all, they ought to 
nourish a great hope. In the hymns of the good era, this is expressed marvelously…. 
Those were still Christians who lived their faith in the full metaphysical sense of the 
word. That mentality is extremely rare today. People are cut off from transcendence, 
transcendence is vanishing. But if someone somehow still preserves this relationship to 
transcendence, he is ‘ultimately’ safe from fear. He can have the feeling of participation, 
he can tell himself that horrible things are happening, but that behind them a great light is 
dawning.188 
 
Jünger subtly implies that this vanishing mentality was a product of the long nineteenth 
century—an era filled towards its conclusion, at least amongst sections of the intellectual and 
artistic classes, with a combination of positivism, anxiety, and hope (even for war) as humanity 
was continually ‘improving’, or at least maintained the potential to189—and that people had now 
lost faith in transcendent ideas and the cathartic value they offer.  
If one takes this as a baseline, it seems that such a mentality was a more basic faith in the 
potential for human change that preceded the filling of the modular empty vessel of identity—the 
writing of definitions on the identity tabula rasa—and, perhaps most importantly, one that both 
Jünger and Hesse had readily available by virtue of their educations and literary inclinations. 
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This would subsequently explain the intense similarity of their conceptions of nationalism, 
despite their immensely different war experiences, identity evolutions, and normative outlooks, 
especially the fact that both of their conceptions of nationalism were universal, not uniquely 
tailored solely for Germany.    
In this regard, it is also essential to note that Jünger and Hesse—in contrast to other 
intellectual personalities such as the Mann brothers—in fact tell the modern reader relatively 
little about the intellectual field of German Nationalism. Both ultimately conceived of 
Nationalism, perhaps paradoxically, in international terms which were applicable across borders. 
Consequently, they participate in the intellectual field of German Nationalism in a somewhat 
peripheral way by virtue of their nationality as opposed to their conceptions of nationalism, 
which in fact render them members of a more capacious intellectual field, encompassing at least 
the rest of Western Europe.   
Phenomenological speculation aside, it is clear that emotional—more so than political, 
social, or cultural—dynamics were the primary determinants of both Jünger and Hesse’s 
nationalisms. The evolution of those conceptions reflects those dynamics, along with the 
intensity of the Great War’s emotional trauma, as well as demonstrating that the abstract 
conception of nationalism appeared to function in an echo Jay Winter’s point about the initial 
purpose of Great War memorials: it was only after the war—after the most intense period of 
mourning had passed and emotional trauma was less visceral—that nationalism took on a 
principally political character. German Nationalism offered a deeply-rooted and socially 
acceptable mechanism to vent these intense emotions, generated during what would prove to be 
only a precursor to true total war.  
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